The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS) has been a mainstay of outcome and process research into the cognitive model of depression. It is was developed by Weissman and Beck (Weissman,
1979; Weissman & Beck,
1978) to measure enduring depression-related beliefs encountered in the course of psychotherapy. In contrast to transitory negative cognitions (automatic thoughts), these beliefs are more persistent, and the same beliefs may be encountered across successive symptomatic episodes. Beck et al. (
1987, p. 20) reasoned that because it was implausible that the same maladaptive cognitive patterns were recreated anew every time an individual experienced an episode of depression, these beliefs likely reflected psychological mechanisms that persisted in some manner between episodes, representing a vulnerability for the depression to recur. There is a significant body of literature supporting the DAS as a measure of vulnerability to depression within the context of research on Beck’s cognitive theory (e.g., Brown et al.,
1995; Miranda et al.,
1998; Otto et al.,
2007), although it has not performed as predicted in some critical contexts, for example, appearing to covary over time with depression symptom levels (e.g., Barnett & Gotlib,
1998; Cristea et al.,
2015). The DAS has been the focus of important critiques of the cognitive therapy model (Coyne,
1982), responses to those critiques (Segal & Shaw,
1986), and, generally, has been the central marker of etiological claims of CBT (Segal,
1988). Any change to the understanding of the composition of the DAS would have potentially far-reaching implications for a large body of literature.
It is unlikely that Weissman intended to permanently freeze the DAS at this point in its development. However, in the intervening years, the DAS-A as originally constituted by her has come to be the default version of the scale used in both research and practice and the version usually reported on in psychometric studies. A re-examination of the original full DAS would be necessary to establish if the assumptions implied by Weissman’s analysis are tenable—that the DAS was either essentially unidimensional or that any multidimensionality was uniform across forms A and B. Such an analysis would also preferably be conducted in a large clinical sample to ensure that clinically important items had not been eliminated by Weissman because they were found to be less salient in her relatively small undergraduate sample. Beck et al. (
1991) undertook such an analysis, and, among other findings, identified a nine-item “Imperatives” factor within the 100-item version never previously found in psychometric studies of the DAS-A items. This factor consisted of moralistic beliefs, typically including the words “should” or “must”. Seven-item versions of the Imperatives factor were replicated in the only two other analyses (in undergraduate samples) of the full original 100-item data pools (Calhoon,
1996; Dyck,
1992). This finding by itself contradicts the assumption of essential unidimensionality of the DAS as well as uniformity across forms: only two Imperatives items appear on the DAS-A, with five appearing on DAS-B. The remaining two items—as it happens, the two items found by Beck et al. to load highest on the Imperatives factor—were among the 21 items that did not make it onto either DAS-A or B, thereby confirming the possibility that clinically important items had been eliminated. Finally, it is important to note that the content of the Imperatives factor is substantive. As Brown and Beck (
1989) pointed out, the role of self-coercive moralistic beliefs in amplifying emotional problems has long been recognized in psychotherapy across diverse theoretical positions.
Within research on the dimensionality of the DAS-A itself there are broad regularities that are discernible but nothing approaching a definitive consensus concerning its dimensional composition (for selective reviews, please see de Graaf et al.,
2009 and Moore et al.,
2014). From one to four underlying dimensions have been reported, but two factors are most commonly found, with one of these relating to achievement/perfectionism and the second concerned with interpersonal dependence and desire for approval. Notably, the specific item composition of the factors has varied substantially across studies such that there is no stable core set of items associated with each factor. Where more than two factors are reported, these usually result from splitting one or both of the main two (achievement and approval) factors, suggesting that these findings likely result from misspecification of the number of factors. Likewise, misspecification in the opposite, “lumping” direction is likely to be the case where a single factor has been reported. In the Moore et al. (
2014) study, a series of analyses combining data-driven (e.g., SEM modification indices) and subjective criteria (e.g., judging that the general factor of a bifactor model represented the presence of a single underlying dimension) resulted in the DAS being reduced to a single, 19-item perfectionism scale, with the counterintuitive result of a putative depression vulnerability scale that does not measure concern with social acceptance.
Other response anomalies may, in contrast, lead to underestimates of validity. In this regard, scales like the DAS and ASI that require complex judgments are known to be particularly susceptible to eliciting response sets (Cronbach,
1950). DeRubeis and colleagues (Forand & DeRubeis,
2014; Forand et al.,
2016) have described a positive extreme response set encountered with the DAS according to which respondents systematically choose the highest rating in the “adaptive” direction of responding (“completely agree” or “completely disagree”) whether or not, on objective examination of item content, these extreme responses would be justified as being adaptive on rational grounds. This positive extreme response style has been shown to predict depression relapse (Brouwer et al.,
2019), which means that, paradoxically, putatively more
adaptive scores on these items ultimately predict worse future functioning, a clear threat to the validity of the DAS as a straightforward measure of its target construct if this response set is not eliminated or compensated for in some way.
Discussion
In the present study, we were able to capitalize on recent innovations in psychometric analysis to advance understanding of the DAS, arguably the most important instrument in CBT research and practice, beyond what was previously attainable. The traditional latent variable approach entails considerable subjective judgment regarding dimensionality and subscale composition. Where there is a strong signal in the data regarding the underlying structure of an instrument, this subjectivity is less liable to introduce distortion that impedes identification of the true underlying measurement model. However, items on scales like the DAS are inherently complex, which creates subtle cross-cutting sources of variance, and these are nearly impossible to identify solely on the basis of visual inspection of output, identification of areas of local dependence, and rational analysis. In the updated approach based on network mathematics followed here, dimensionality is determined by community detection algorithms, items are assigned to the dimension they associate with most stably in the long-run, and repetitive, semantically similar items are regarded as sources of distortion rather than building blocks of reliability.
As noted in the introduction, psychometric analyses of the DAS have mostly focused on Weissman’s Form A and have typically identified two or three dimensions, with an achievement/perfectionism factor and a social approval/acceptance factor almost always in the mix. While there has been one notable study (Moore et al.,
2014) whose one-factor solution likely represents lumping, splitting through overfactoring is much more common, as epitomized by the current study’s predecessor, Beck et al. (
1991). Table SM1 in the supplementary materials offers a compelling blueprint of what overfactoring looks like relative to the likely more precise solution of the present analysis. The factor named Negative Expectancy in the current analysis was called Vulnerability by Beck et al. (
1991). Negative Expectancy is essentially a reduced version of Vulnerability with redundant items removed, which is also true of Beck et al.’s Success-Perfectionism relative to the current High Standards subscale. Beck et al.’s Need for Approval is the first “bloated specific” we encounter in the table, built on redundant items, which is also true of Need to Please Others, Need to Impress, and Avoidance of Appearing Weak. The fact that the names that were chosen for these are based on inferred motivation (all described as reflecting putative needs) is potentially a consequence of their synthetic nature, requiring a “need” to be read into what distinguishes a given group from other items in the absence of a more immediately salient basis. For the most part, these appear to result from overfactoring of the current Acceptability to Others subscale, the core of which appears on Beck et al.’s Disapproval-Dependence factor.
In contrast, the Imperatives factor is almost identical to Beck et al.’s factor with the same name, with the exception of the omission of one redundant item. The Cognitive Flexibility factor only appears in a truncated, three-item form in the Beck et al. solution as Control Over Emotions. The remaining Cognitive Flexibility items were eliminated by Beck et al.’s subsequent procedures and so appear here for the first time since Weissman’s original analyses. Notably, this scale does not appear to be merely a method variance factor due to positive keying (Rosellini & Brown,
2021) as five of nine of the ATO items were also positively keyed. A number of instruments have been developed that seek to quantify skill acquisition as a result of cognitive therapy (Barber & DeRubeis,
2001; Jarrett et al.,
2011; Strunk et al.,
2014) mainly tied to self report or rater assessment of actual or hypothetical behavior in response to challenging situations. The Cognitive Flexibility factor potentially adds to and complements these scales by tapping into corresponding beliefs.
Strikingly, with reference to Table
1, the content of Weissman’s Form A and Form B are remarkably non-overlapping, such that it might be said they resemble each other much more like long lost cousins than the fraternal twins they were intended to be. The Acceptability to Others and High Standards factors are mostly made up of items from DAS-A, which means it should be feasible to repeat important archival analyses that used DAS-A by applying the scoring from the measurement structure derived in the present study. Cognitive Flexibility, Imperatives, and Negative Expectancy are made up mostly of items from DAS-B. Notably, only 12 of 42 (28.6%) items on the new scale versus 23 of 40 (57.5%) of items on DAS-A were identified by DeRubeis and colleagues are “style” items judged to be prone to extreme positive responding. It may be that the emphasis on long-run stability in item analysis eliminated items that were unstable due to multiple sources of variance that included response styles. However, in a further twist, most of the style items that made it into the present version of the DAS load on the Acceptability to Others dimension. It might not be too farfetched to suppose that concern with acceptability could be confounded with a tendency to “protest too much” that one is not dependent, which would be consistent with this observed pattern of findings.
As for the Negative Expectancy subscale, its content appears, on the surface, to be heterogeneous, and a straightforward theme does not immediately emerge. However, compared to the other subscales, it appears to denote
actual, rather than hypothetical, depression. The following are suggested understandings of the dimension within the context of CBT research and theory, any or all of which may prove to be supportable pending further research:
1.
The factor is a sampling of the propositional content of the thinking of individuals with ongoing depressive episodes. In line with the distinct nature of thought during depression compared to the same person’s thinking outside of an episode, Teasdale (1997) drew on Ornstein’s notion of multiple minds. Each “mind” is a comprehensive mental model which can be instantiated where appropriate to deal with situations appropriate to that “mind.” With regard to the depressive “mind-in-place” Teasdale wrote,
…normal mood is characterized by functional mental models, in which personal worth is relatively independent of whether or not one is liked by others or whether one succeeds or fails at tasks…Interpreted through [depressive] models, failure or disapproval will be interpreted more catastrophically…because such events imply global personal worthlessness. (p. 74)
2.
Negative expectancy operationalizes one of Beck’s central concepts with regard to depression, the
negative view of the world aspect of the negative cognitive triad. In contrast to the
negative view of the future and
negative view of the self for which Beck and colleagues developed measurement instruments (the Beck Hopelessness Scale and Beck Self Concept Test, respectively), a corresponding scale was never developed for the third leg of the triad. The content of Negative Expectancy is consistent with Weissman’s descriptions of this aspect of the triad:
The depressed person tends to see his world as making exorbitant demands on him and as presenting obstacles that cannot be surmounted. He interprets his interactions with his environment in terms of defeat and failure, deprivation, or disparagement. (Weissman,
1979, p. 21).
3.
Negative Expectancy represents a disposition to depression that is more immediate than the other four subscales, which are more distal and more conditional. Using the distinction Ryle (1949) draws between different dispositions, Negative Expectancy represents ongoing proneness to experience negativity characteristic of an imminent depressive episode or one already in progress that is less dependent on congruent environmental triggers. In contrast, the other four scales represent hypothetical liabilities to become depressed given appropriate life experiences.
This view informed the validity analyses carried out with the Negative Expectancy factor, and the results were consistent with this view in that NE was most closely associated with the subscales of hopelessness and depression symptoms. This has potentially significant implications for important lines of research that have employed the DAS. A considerable body of research has largely shown that DAS scores covary with depressive symptoms (summarized by Barnett & Gotlib,
1998), which contradicts the concept of the DAS measuring a vulnerability that persists between episodes but rather indicates it is a concomitant of depression. As suggested above, it could be that NE measures an immediate proneness to depression that emerges along with symptoms. In contrast, the other scales are more in line with the picture of enduring vulnerability that requires a matching trigger to activate, so that DAS subscales comprise both precursors and concomitants of depression. A related line of research aimed at resolving the apparent state dependence of the DAS has come to be referred to as the cognitive reactivity paradigm. Miranda et al. (1998) first showed that elevated DAS scores differentiated remitted from never depressed participants only following a negative mood induction. It may be that here, too, the effect is mainly due to negative expectancy and largely not found in subscales that have more to do with ongoing values (e.g., HS and ATO) that should not change appreciably as a function of mood. A finer-grained analysis in terms of subscales may help explain the unreliability of the effect, which, for example, has been replicated among CBT responders (Segal et al.,
2006) but not among those with incomplete symptom remission following therapy (Jarrett et al.,
2012). The discrepancy may not be substantive but rather due to measurement artifacts these authors were not in a position to evaluate. For example, in the latter study, DAS-A was used at baseline and DAS-B at follow-up under the assumption that they were suitable to be used as parallel forms, an assumption the present study conclusively contradicts.
The initial sequence of analyses that identified a five-dimension measurement structure was undertaken from the standpoint of presumed multidimensionality. As they frequently do, bifactor analyses offered support for both a unidimensional and multidimensional structure. We aimed to gain further clarity by “rewinding” the process back to the point that redundant items had been eliminated and carried out a series of analyses geared to identifying a unidimensional solution. The fact that 39 items needed to be eliminated to be left with a 27-item unidimensional scale can be taken as further support for the multidimensionality of the DAS. This single dimension bore some resemblance to Moore et al.’s (
2014) single dimension solution but also retained elements of Acceptability to Others and Negative Expectancy. Presuming unidimensionality purely based on the high association between the factors would, in line with the traditional latent variable approach, presuppose a reflective overall latent variable that causes its indicators, in this case, the single factors. Van den Hout (
2014) argues convincingly that the latent variable approach as applied to psychopathology is tautological. It entails having a phenomenon be, at the same time, defined by and explained by its constituents. Alternatively, from the network standpoint, the constituents mutually influence each other, and their association emerges from this mutual influence rather than reflecting an underlying deeper-level construct.
Moreover, we would expect the covariance of dimensions to be maximal in clinical samples that represent the culmination of the development of their presenting problems due to patterns of mutual influence between these factors over time. Whether a hierarchical or correlated factor structure is more justified has implications for what uses the factors identified in the present study can be put to, with reference to the analyses summarized in Table
2. Future research in nonsymptomatic samples will be needed to understand the relationship between these constructs at an earlier developmental point to confirm these suppositions about the correct measurement model. Research in nonclinical samples can also help establish whether there are distinct profiles of subscales (e.g., the anaclitic vs. self-critical subtypes of Blatt and the sociotropic and autonomous subtypes of Beck), which will also be relatively difficult to establish in clinical samples that represent the endpoint of the interplay of these factors and for which scores are therefore likely at a maximum.
With regard to exploratory factor analysis, Haig (
In press) has observed that “In a real sense, EFA narrows down the space of a potentially large number of candidate theories to a manageable subset by facilitating judgments of initial plausibility.” (p. 10) The present analysis suggests a plausible shape to the exhaustive pool of beliefs reflecting a disposition to depression Weissman had compiled. Figure
4 represents a potential configuration of the DAS dimensions that is not meant to be definitive but serves as a plausible starting point for further efforts. Imperatives and Cognitive Flexibility are conceived of as broad indicators of belief “style.” These will influence the manner of and the degree to which beliefs within the two value dimensions (HS and ATO) are adhered to, all of which jointly represent the risk for a particular individual for their depressive mind to be lodged in place, as reflected in the elevated activity of the legs of the cognitive triad, most particularly Negative Expectancy.
Notably, the foregoing account does not refer to the fundamental concept of the schema used by Beck to explain susceptibility to depression as well as the distinctive processing of experience during episodes. The DAS was regarded as the main means for demonstrating the action of schemas. However, as Segal (
1988) argued, self-report scales like the DAS can only represent content. In contrast, structural concepts such as schemas require a means of capturing functional relations that is not possible solely with reference to content. Still, more recent understandings of beliefs as dispositions that do not require an underlying representational architecture (e.g., Schwitzgebel,
2013) and the propositional nature of learning (e.g., De Houwer,
2009) support the presence of beliefs alone as sufficient grounds for demonstrating an underlying disposition. The validity of this aspect of Beck’s theory can be upheld if scales of relevant beliefs like the DAS are markers of schematic processing even if they do not themselves constitute schemas, a question for future research.
A clear limitation of the present study is that the data was collected a generation ago. The scale used gendered language that needed to be changed for the present paper. Further data is currently being collected with a version of the scale that uses gender neutral pronouns. Analyses such as differential item functioning as a function of gender would typically be included in the sort of study undertaken here but would be undoubtedly outdated. Such analyses should be a priority for further studies with contemporary data collection. In the same vein, the DAS largely reflects the values of the dominant culture of the time, and efforts to broaden scales like the DAS to capture the more diverse contemporary culture are an ethical imperative as well as good science. Indeed, the title of the scale itself implies a value judgment that is at odds with contemporary sensibilities; an alternative name for the scale that retains the same acronym would be advisable.
The current study can be seen as establishing a new 53-item baseline pool of DAS items made up of the 42-item five-dimensional scale plus the 11 items that were non-duplicates but contributed to the general dimension in the unidimensional analyses. The latter set of items may confound delineating distinct dimensions. Still, it might include the precise belief that is the central issue for a given person when DAS items are used clinically. They may also contribute to insights about the DAS dimensions that can underpin future work on fleshing out (and potentially modernizing) the underlying constructs. More technically, further work will be needed to determine if the seven-point Likert scale with a neutral midpoint is the best format for capturing this type of belief. Beevers et al., (
2007) found that a four-point scale without a neutral middle anchor was optimal; however, more recent techniques (e.g., IRTrees, Park & Wu,
2019) can potentially shed light on whether responses are anchored in response options that are not the final response given. These can also potentially provide further insight into response sets (e.g., Leventhal,
2018) such as those identified by De Rubeis and colleagues (e.g., Forand & DeRubeis,
2014), which were ameliorated in the present analysis but only fortuitously. The ultimate test of the DAS will be, as it has always been, whether it can successfully predict who is prone to develop depression or experience a recurrence. The additional scales and greater precision of measurement structure renew its potential for being equal to this purpose.
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