Swipe om te navigeren naar een ander artikel
Contrary to what common sense makes us believe, deliberation without attention has recently been suggested to produce better decisions in complex situations than deliberation with attention. Based on differences between cognitive processes of experts and novices, we hypothesized that experts make in fact better decisions after consciously thinking about complex problems whereas novices may benefit from deliberation-without-attention. These hypotheses were confirmed in a study among doctors and medical students. They diagnosed complex and routine problems under three conditions, an immediate-decision condition and two delayed conditions: conscious thought and deliberation-without-attention. Doctors did better with conscious deliberation when problems were complex, whereas reasoning mode did not matter in simple problems. In contrast, deliberation-without-attention improved novices’ decisions, but only in simple problems. Experts benefit from consciously thinking about complex problems; for novices thinking does not help in those cases.
Acker, F. (2008). New findings on unconscious versus conscious thought in decision making: Additional empirical data and meta- analysis. Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 292–303.
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., Epley, N., & Eyre, R. N. (2007). Overcoming intuition: Metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 569–576. CrossRef
Chi, M. T. H., Feltovich, P. J., & Glaser, R. (1981). Categorization and representation of physics problems by experts and novices. Cognitive Science, 5, 121–152. CrossRef
Newell, B. R., Wong, K. Y., Cheung, J. C. H., & Rakow, T. (2009). Think, blink or sleep on it? The impact of modes of thought on complex decision making. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 707–732.
Osman, M. (2004). An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 988–1010.
Redelmeier, D. A. (2005). The cognitive psychology of missed diagnoses. Annals of Internal Medicine, 142, 115–120. PubMed
Rikers, R. M. J. P., Schmidt, H. G., & Boshuizen, H. P. A. (2002). On the constraints of encapsulated knowledge: Clinical case representations by medical experts and subexperts. Cognition and Instruction, 20, 27–45. CrossRef
Schmidt, H. G., & Boshuizen, H. P. A. (1993). On acquiring expertise in medicine. Educational Psychology Review, 5, 1–17. CrossRef
Schmidt, H. G., & Rikers, R. M. J. P. (2007). How expertise develops in medicine: Knowledge encapsulation and illness script formation. Medical Education, 41(12), 1133–1139. PubMed
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bull, 119, 3–22. CrossRef
- Conscious thought beats deliberation without attention in diagnostic decision-making: at least when you are an expert
Henk G. Schmidt
Remy M. J. P. Rikers
Eugene J. F. M. Custers
Ted A. W. Splinter
Jan L. C. M. van Saase