The Intentional Dynamic and Phenomenology: The Relevance of Brentano’s Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

In the final chapter we continue the critical exposition of Brentano’s system of 1874. The important theme of the representational nature of consciousness in the PES is taken into account and the challenge posed from higher-order theories of representation is taken up. Thereafter, a criticism of Brentano’s deflationary semantic theory and the role of presentations as immanent bearers of truth-values will be outlined. We will find that there are relevant and compelling challenges to Brentano’s position not so much from materialist alternatives as from other metaphysical and philosophical points of view. We then briefly show how the deflationary semantic doctrine inherent in Brentano’s theory of intentionality and existential theory of judgment can be criticized. This latter challenge strikes at the heart of Brentano’s empiricism in the PES and points to the threat that can be leveled against his system from within. After a deeper analysis of what can be called “the transcendental criticism” of Brentano’s epistemology we conclude by giving an overview of the insights for philosophy of mind that are still valuable in Brentano’s system. This will include providing suggestions for moving beyond Brentano, while applying some of the important strategies that his system has to offer to contemporary philosophy of mind.