Conclusion

Abstract

Franz Brentano’s writings have not received the attention they deserve in contemporary philosophy of mind. The above study has attempted to make the case that there is no objective reason why Brentano’s contributions in this area should not be actively taken up by contemporary thinkers. Outlining the original Aristotelian context of Brentano’s studies allowed us to contextualize the system established in his magnum opus the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874). In the presentation of the system developed in the PES, we showed how Brentano’s doctrines touch on still important matters in contemporary philosophy of mind. Amongst these were discussed: the intentionality of mental acts, the identity and unity of the stream of consciousness, the problem of representational consciousness, the mind-body problem, and matters pertaining to the individuation of thought contents. In giving a critical overview of the PES, it was also shown how Brentano’s introduction of a descriptive method and his theoretical focus on phenomenal consciousness can present a viable alternative to leading theories in psychology and philosophy. Higher-order theories about thought and perception, for example, are prone to both ad hoc assumptions about the ontological relationship of the mental to the physical and also frequently beg the question against what is arguably a philosophically important point about how to properly articulate the foundations of philosophy of mind.