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On Knowing Your Own Beliefs: A Representationalist Account

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New Essays on Belief

Abstract

This chapter first outlines the interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge, developed and defended at length in my 2011 book, The Opacity of Mind. It then considers and critiques a pair of competitors, each of which regards the relationship between one’s beliefs and one’s knowledge of them as constitutive rather than relational. The first is a form of dispositionalism about belief. The second builds on the distinction drawn by cognitive scientists between so-called “System 1” and “System 2” reasoning processes.

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Authors
  1. Peter Carruthers
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Southern Denmark, Denmark

    Nikolaj Nottelmann

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© 2013 Peter Carruthers

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Carruthers, P. (2013). On Knowing Your Own Beliefs: A Representationalist Account. In: Nottelmann, N. (eds) New Essays on Belief. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_8

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