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Belief Metaphysics: The Basic Questions

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New Essays on Belief
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Abstract

The rapid stream of literature on the metaphysics of belief shows no signs of calming or slowing down. Taming it is obviously beyond the power of any individual philosopher. Still, the time seems ripe for stepping back and focusing on the questions: What keeps this current running and what forced it to take the twists and turns it has so far taken? It is time to bring into a clearer focus the following: Which are the basic metaphysical questions we may want to answer concerning belief? How are those questions connected? How should we go about answering them? The present chapter is meant as a serious effort towards answering those meta-questions concerning the metaphysics of belief.

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© 2013 Nikolaj Nottelmann

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Nottelmann, N. (2013). Belief Metaphysics: The Basic Questions. In: Nottelmann, N. (eds) New Essays on Belief. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_2

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