Abstract
Propositional belief state intensity is equivalently spoken of colloquially but no less phenomenologically as the strength of a believer’s belief. Belief state intensity is experienced first-hand when we know ourselves to accept a proposition’s truth with greater or lesser sense of importance or urgency and priority or precedence than in the case of other beliefs.1
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© 2013 Dale Jacquette
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Jacquette, D. (2013). Belief State Intensity. In: Nottelmann, N. (eds) New Essays on Belief. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137026521_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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