Reasoning and Pragmatics: the Case of Even-If

Abstract

Researchers interested in the psychology of reasoning often regard pragmatics as being somehow less worthy of interest than ‘actual reasoning’. Pragmatic factors are often regarded as extraneous variables that interfere with people’s ability to compute logical inferences. Another view is that there are separate associative and symbol-manipulating systems for thinking (Evans and Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999; Sloman, 1996). Under this view, the symbol-manipulating or logical system is often seen as more interesting or more characteristic of higher forms of thought than is the associative or pragmatic system. Although there are notable exceptions to these views (see Sperber, Cara and Girotto, 1995; Hilton, 1995), their preponderance is understandable given the way in which research on the psychology of reasoning has developed since the 1960s when Peter Wason first demonstrated the influence of extra-logical factors on people’s thinking. Although he was motivated in this by his disagreement with Piagetian views about thinking, Wason’s work had a consequence that he could not have foreseen. By saying that thinking was NOT logical, Wason helped to shape the development of paradigms in the field where performance was measured against the yardstick of logically correct performance.