Abstract
The following discussion of a few phenomenological forms of activities of mental representation is best viewed as a development towards a general phenomenological theory of reference in the intuitive manner. Let me say a word beforehand about the use of the phenomenological notation in what follows. In progressively elaborating the henceforth more complex phenomenological forms, I will go back and forth between ordinary language and signs of the notation. The resulting formulae, or partial formulae, will finally be rendered in common language.
The understanding consists ... primarily in diversifying consciousness by means of “the mirroring” (general reflexivity) of other consciousness or ... in the breaking through (transcendence) of the immediate unity of the sensible present by means of representation.
I. Kern (1975), p. 711
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Notes to Chapter Three
Der Verstand besteht... primär in der Vervielfältigung des Bewusstseins durch die `Spiegelung’ (allgemeine Reflexivität) anderen Bewusstseins oder... im Durchbrechen (Transzendenz) der unmittelbaren Einheit der sinnlichen Gegenwart durch die Vergegenwärtigung. “
In “Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffsschrift”: “Die Schrift bietet die Mög- lichkeit Vieles gleichzeitig gegenwärtig zu halten, und wenn wir auch nur einen kleinen Teil davon in jedem Augenblick ins Auge fassen können, so behalten wir doch einen allgemeinen Eindruck auch vom Übrigen, und dieses steht, wann wir es brauchen, sofort zu unserer Verfügung” (p. [53], 111; emphasis mine).
See, e.g., Husserl (1908) in Hua XXVI (1987), chapter 4. For an instructive comparative presentation of the question of reference to something objective and identical, see Mohanty in R. W. Shahan and Chris Swoyer (Eds.), 1979, discussing the views of Quine, Piaget, and Husserl. With regard to Husserl, in particular, Mohanty makes the same point I wish to emphasize as well, when he writes: “It is important to recall that, for Husserl, the notion of identity belongs to a developed concept of object. An object is one which is not merely being perceived here and now, but to which one can return again. Identity is constituted by identificatory acts. The identifying act posits the object as the same in different temporal positions” (p. 37). See also Kern (1975), §20, who, drawing on Husserl, makes clear the difference between ideal (atemporal) identity and real identity in the sense of a temporally enduring object, a point that seems somehow missed in Mohanty’s otherwise illuminating discussion. The best recent discussion of the question of the identity in Husserlian phenomenology to my knowledge is by Sokolowski (1990). — See also chapter 4, below.
Tugendhat (1982), p. 62; in German (1976), p. 86: “Das Bewusstsein bezieht sich auf Gegenstände, indem es sie `vorstellt”’.
Compare op. cit., p. 380; in German (1976), p. 481f.
op. cit., p. 381; in German (1976), p. 483.
See, e. g, Husserl’s list of ambiguities of the term “Vorstellung” (“representation”) in the fifth of his Logical Investigations,Hua XIX/l (1984), §44, p. 520ff.
See p. 278; in German (1976), p. 351: “... wenn man vom Logischen, vom Sprachlichen absieht, ist uns bewusstseinsmässig nichts anderes gegeben als Sinnliches”.
See p. 280; in German, p. 354: “... dass die Rede von einer nicht sinnlichen, einer irgendwie intellektuellen Vorstellung keinen Sinn gibt”. See also, e.g., p. 65: “Nor do we have a clear concept of the various non-logical modes of consciousness”; in German, p. 92: “... wir haben auch keinen deutlichen Begriff von den verschiedenen nichtlogischen Bewusstseinsweisen. “— See also chapter 4 where I will continue the discussion with Tugendhat whom I take to be a proponent of a widespread view concerning the question of reference to something objective, in which the function of consiousness seems unterestimated.
With reference to the term `Gleichheit’ (“equality”), Frege (1892) says: “Ich brauche dies Wort im Sinne von Identität und verstehe `a = b’ in dem Sinne von `a ist dasselbe wie b’ oder `a und b fallen zusammen”’ (p. [251,40).
See Frege (1892): “Wenn sich das Zeichen `a’ von dem Zeichen ‘b’ nur als Gegenstand (hier durch die Gestalt) unterscheidet, nicht als Zeichen; das soll heissen: nicht in der Weise, wie es etwas bezeichnet...” (p. [26],41; emphasis mine).
Frege is alluding to Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments: “a=a gilt a priori und ist nach Kant analytisch zu nennen, während Sätze von der Form a = b oft sehr wertvolle Erweiterungen unserer Erkenntnis enthalten und a priori nicht immer zu begründen sind” (1892, p. [251,40).
Frege (1892): “... wir setzen eine Bedeutung voraus” (p. [31],46).
op cit.: “Nun können wir uns in jener Voraussetzung freilich irren, und solche Irrtümer sind auch vorgekommen. Die Frage aber, ob wir uns vielleicht immer darin irren, kann hier unbeantwortet bleiben; es genügt zunächst, auf unsere Absicht beim Sprechen oder Denken hinzuweisen, um es zu rechtfertigen, von der Bedeutung eines Zeichens zu sprechen, wenn auch mit dem Vorbehalte: falls eine solche vorhanden ist” (p. [31f.],46).
op. cit.: “Es wäre... eine Beziehung eines Dinges zu sich selbst ausgedrückt, und zwar eine solche, in der jedes Ding mit sich selbst, aber kein Ding mit einem anderen steht” (p. [26],40).
See op. cit.: “Eine Verschiedenheit kann nur dadurch zustande kommen, dass der Unterschied des Zeichens einem Unterschied in der Art des Gegebenseins des Bezeichneten entspricht” (p. [26],41; emphasis mine). See also: “Es liegt nun nahe, mit einem Zeichen (Namen, Wortverbindung, Schriftzeichen) ausser dem Bezeichneten, was die Bedeutung des Zeichens heissen möge, noch das verbunden zu denken, was ich den Sinn des Zeichens nennen möchte, worin die Art des Gegebenseins (scil.: des Bezeichneten) enthalten ist” (p [261,41).
Notice, by the way, that this kind of recourse to the mental would not conflict with Frege’s ban on the range of “Anschauungen” (“intuitions”) and “Vorstellungen” (“presentations”) which seems legitimate for the purposes pursued in his analysis. Frege calls Vorstellungen “subjective”; see, e.g., Frege (1884), §61. With these “Vorstellungen” Frege has in mind accompanying presentations as they may occur as subjective psychological matters of fact while making use of signs. In this function they are rightly left out of consideration in logico-mathematical contexts. Husserl (1901), too, banned this sort of “illustrative”, “imaginative” or “accompanying presentations” in relation to the meaning of linguistic expressions (see the first of his Logical Investigations,chapter 2). See also, e.g., Frege (1884), §60. The mental that is in question in our present context concerns forms of consciousness, and that already at a level prior to the occurrence of language and other sign systems. Here, too, these forms of consciousness are not of interest from a psychological factual point of view but rather from the point of view of the very possibility of experience (see Introduction, p. lf.).
As Frege (1882) pointed out: “Die logischen Verhältnisse werden durch die Sprache fast immer nur angedeutet,dem Erraten überlassen, nicht eigentlich ausgedrückt” (p. [51],109; emphasis mine). Mutatis mutandis, it might be said that the phenomenological circumstances concerning consciousness,too, are usually merely hinted at and not properly expressed in everyday language (see Kern (1975), §56, p. 378).
For designating what I have discussed up to this point regarding the intentional reference to something objective and identical, I used to propose a formula of the following type in earlier presentations of the matter (Marbach (1984) and Marbach (1987)):(d) (REP [(PER)x])x i.e. I am representing x by means of representing a perceiving of x. Until recently this formula seemed to me quite all right. At present, however, I clearly prefer (3) as it appears in the body of the text. The good reasons I earlier used to advance for (d) are preserved with formula (3). These reasons are related to the modified activity — designated by means of the ’[]’-brackets — which requires its intentional correlate. But ironically, if the correlate is written in the manner shown in (d), the phenomenologically crucial point may just be missed or the expression can easily be misunderstood. In my earlier presentations, I did indeed mainly try to dissipate such misunderstanding, but I failed to make sufficiently clear that sameness, actual identity of x,becomes a phenomenological issue really only in virtue of a plurality of mental activities. This plurality explains why one and the same object, taken as intentional correlate, is mentioned more than once when describing the activities involved in the identification of the object, designated by ‘x’. However, if the letter `x’ appears more than once in the formula (as in (d), above), it is possible to misunderstand the formula to the effect that there be more than one object involved. Or, even if we consider that the object in question is at least designated by using at each of its occurrences a letter ‘x’, the expression (d) may still be misinterpreted as meaning that one and the same object occurs more than once if reference is established to x in its absence. Moreover, logicians too might be puzzled with two appearances of `x’ where there is only one object referred to. Thus, even though we are here concerned with phenomenology, and not with logical analysis, it is surely preferable to be as close as possible to well-established standards of notation. Things are still unusual enough when the point of view of consciousness is brought to bear in the context of the question of identity. Finally, what speaks in favor of formula (3) rather than (d) is also this: the simpler the better! This will become more apparent in the course of the following chapters of this study.
Einerseits haben wir die schlichte reproduktive Modifikation, die schlichte Vergegenwärtigung, die sich in ihrem eigenen Wesen,merkwürdig genug, als Modifikation eines anderen gibt. Die Vergegenwärtigung weist zurück auf Wahrnehmung in ihrem eigenen phänomenologischen Wesen: z. B. das Sich-erinnern an Vergangenes impliziert... das Wahrgenommenhaben’; also in gewisser Weise ist die `entsprechende’ Wahrnehmung... in der Erinnerung bewusst, aber doch nicht wirklich in ihr enthalten. Die Erinnerung ist eben in ihrem eigenen Wesen `Modifikation von’ Wahrnehmung” (Hua íH11, §99, p. 233f.; Husserl’s emphasis).
See manuscript L I 19, p. 10a: `jede`Modifikation’ (ist) dadurch charakterisiert..., dass in ihr selbst die Beziehung auf ein anderes Bewusstsein, von dem sie Modifikation heisst, beschlossen ist, ein Bewusstsein, das in ihr nicht wirklich enthalten und doch für eine passend gerichtete Reflexion fassbar ist” (quoted in my Introduction to Hua XXIII (1980), p. LXX).
See Leibniz (1982): “Sed haec omnia ex ipso progressu melius apparebunt. Et praestat progredi, quam nimia quadam morositate obhaerescere in ipsis initiis”, p. 18, lines 236–239.
See, e.g., Husserl (1908) in Hua XXVI (1987), Husserl (1929) in Hua XVII, or Erfahrung und Urteil.
Compare Hua XXIII (1980), Beilage XXXV (between 1910 and 1912): “Erlebnis und Erlebnis-Reproduktion betrachten wir als wesentlich zusammengehörig.... Andererseits haben aber ein Erlebnis und die Erlebnisreproduktion selbst kein gemeinsames Wesen.... Die beiderseitigen Wesen entsprechen einander, aber in der Weise eigentümlicher Modifikation.... Das betrifft natürlich auch alle Korrelate von Erlebnissen im Vergleich mit den Korrelaten von Reproduktionen von Erlebnissen” (p. 327). And: “Beiderseits `dasselbe’ und doch durch und durch modifiziert, so dass nichts von wirklicher Identität übrig bleibt. Demnach auch nichts von Gleichheit und echter Ähnlichkeit” (p. 327, note 2; emphasis partly mine). This may be a good place to express the following hope! One day I hope to be able to present a paper comparing the account of mental representation in terms of intentionally implied perception, i.e. of perception in the mode of non-actuality or through and through modified perception, with some recent Anglo-American studies of mind and imagination (phantasia) in Aristotle. I think of, e.g., Schofield (1978), D. Modrak (1986) and (1987), and especially Wedin (1988). To provide at least a hunch that, from the point of view of the matter of study at hand, these contributions are relevant, indeed, consider this: Schofield presents an interpretation of phantasia, according to which Aristotle “seems to be concerned with a capacity for having... non-paradigmatic sensory experiences” (p. 101, et passim). Modrak (1986) proposes “to characterize phantasia as the awareness of a sensory content under conditions that are not conducive to veridical perception” (p. 49; 56 et passim). While Modrak (1986) just briefly refers to related contemporary work on mental imagery in the last section of her paper (p. 66ff.), Wedin in turn points out right away that to some extent his views on the matter “have also been shaped by contemporary discussion, in particular, by what might be called the cognitivist program in psychology and the philosophy of mind” (p. ix). Importantly, Wedin proposes that Aristotle did not regard imagination as a faculty but rather as a general representational capacity that is used in cognitive faculties (see, e.g., p. 57). As Wedin puts it: “If, then, imagination is not a full faculty, it is surely involved in the actual2 use of such faculties. Perception, desire, and thought require it and so do memory and even dreams.... One could characterize the situation in the following way. Whenever a subject S performs a cognitive act, S does so in virtue of a faculty and the faculty, in turn, uses images in accomplishing its task. So we have the subject, paradigmatically a person, at the level of the intentional system, a faculty at the subsystem level, and images as general [re]presentational devices that are used by faculty subsystems when the system as a whole performs a given cognitive act (more on this later (see VI. 6 The Human Mind as a [Re]presentational System, p. 245ff.). Although the language is anachronistic and Aristotle has at best a rudimentary notion of information storage and interpretation, what he does say more than justifies the cognitivist idiom” (P. 57 ).
See, e.g., Ideas I (1913) in Husserl (1983), §109: “The Neutrality Modification:... It is a matter, now, of a modification which, in a certain way, completely annuls, completely renders powerless every doxic modality to which it is related... (The modification) does not cancel out, does not `effect’ anything: it is the conscious counterpart of all producing: its neutralization” (p. 257f.); in the original German version in Hua III/1 (1976): “Die Neutralitätsmodifikation:... Es handelt sich jetzt um eine Modifikation, die jede doxische Modalität, auf die sie bezogen wird, in gewisser Weise völlig aufhebt, völlig entkräftet... Sie durchstreicht nicht, sie leistet’ nichts, sie ist das bewusstseinsmässige Gegenstück alles Leistens: dessen Neutralisierung” (p. 247f.; Husserl’s emphasis); and §111: “The Neutrality Modification and Phantasy.... More precisely stated: universally phantasying is the neutrality modification of ’positing’ presentiation,therefore of memory in the widest conceivable sense”; in German: “Neutralitätsmodifikation und Phantasie.... Näher ausgeführt ist das Phantasieren überhaupt die Neutralitätsmodifikation der ‘setzenden’ Vergegenwärtigung,also der Erinnerung im denkbar weitesten Sinne” (p. 250; Husserl’s emphasis).
See, e.g., Hua IV, §60, p. 261ff. especially, where Husserl elaborates on the contrast between possibility in the sense of merely “logical possibility”, mere possibility out of intuitive presentation (“blosser Möglichkeit aus anschaulicher Vorstellung”), and the practical possibility of being able to do something (“praktische Möglichkeit des Könnens”).
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 10 (1909), especially pp. 281ff., Appendix XLV (about 1912), Nr. 18 (1918), pp. 520ff. especially; Appendix LVII (about 1917), Nr. 19 (around 1922/23); Erfahrung und Urteil, §§38–40.
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 11 (1909 or 1910 ).
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 13 (1910).
a) Note that, when in section 3. 1 formula (3) was introduced, which has the same shape as (c) above in the body of the text, the analysis had not yet taken into account the property of belief or suspension of belief. In 3. 1, formula (3) only marked a first step in the reflective analysis.
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Appendix XXXIV (1911 or 1912) and especially Appendix XXX VII (1912).
See above, chapter 2. 3, where Husserl’s metaphorical phrase of “bodily” appearing etc. has been introduced (p. 52f., in particular).
See, e.g., Hua XIII—XV (1973) on questions of intersubjectivity where Husserl presents detailled analyses of the subjects’ embodiment; M. Merleau-Ponty (1945), in particular, Première Partie: Le Corps. L’expérience et la pensée objective. Le problème du corps, p. 81ff.; Deuxième Partie: Le Monde Perçu. La théorie du corps est déjà une théorie de la perception, p. 235ff.; Boehm (1966), Vorrede des Übersetzers, in Merleau-Ponty, Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung, p. Vff.; Kern (1975), §13, §18; Zaner (1964).
See Kern (1975) for an instructive phenomenological discussion of `sensation’ (Empfindung) in terms of “re-activity” (§30).
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 1(1904/05), §20; Appendix I X (1905).
See Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil,§42: “Wenn z. B., während ich meine dingliche Umgebung wahrnehme, ein Erinnerungseinfall über mich kommt, und ich mich ihm gar zuwende, dann verschwindet nicht diese Wahrnehmungswelt; wie sehr sie auch ihre `Aktualität’ verlieren, sich `von mir entfernen’ mag, perzeptiv ist sie immerfort da, in dem weiteren Sinne wahrgenommen” (p. 205).
See, e.g., Hua X (1966), Nr. 45 (between 1907 and 1909), p. 297ff., 301ff., in particular.
See, e.g., Hua XXIII, Appendix LI (around 1912 ): “Was sich isoliert gibt wie eine Phantasie, verdeckt doch in Wahrheit etwas in der Wirklichkeit” (p. 485).
For a brief discussion of some of the experimental work, that of L. R. Brooks in particular, see, e.g., L.ndsay and Norman (1977), p$1328ff.; Richardson (1980), p. 54–59; Morris and Hampson (1983), p. 167–170, in particular.
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 1 (1904/05), §32; Appendix IX (1905); Appendix LI (around 1912 ): “Raum ist nur einmal anschaubar. Solche Sachen geben doch zu denken. Raumanschauung ‘verdeckt’ Raumanschauung” (p. 485 ).
The phenomenon of conflicting points of view will be taken up again in connection with the `I’-question at the end of the present section, p. 91f.
See, e.g., E. Cassirer ([19231,1964), p. 212ff. in particular: “Die Sprache und das Gebiet der ‘inneren Anschauung’. — Die Phasen des Ichbegriffs”. Cassirer develops the view that the formation of the ’I’-concept is not bound to the personal pronoun; rather that it can occur through other linguistic means just as well. He illustrates his point by a number of empirical data from the altaic family of languages, in particular.
Regarding the living body (Leib) as being by itself the subjective principle of unity, Husserl himself occasionally entertained the possibility of such a view; see Hua XV (1973), Appendix L (January 1934), p. 642ff. — As regards the view of finding the unity in the internal time-awareness rather than in an I-principle, A. Gurwitsch (1929) would seem to be subscribing and, perhaps not uninfluenced by Gurwitsch’s important dissertation, Sartre ([1936–37],1965), too, preferred the non-egological conception of consciousness (see, e.g., p. 20–23) as it can be ascribed to the Husserl of the first edition of the Logical Investigations. For a fuller, mainly historical discussion of the problems pertaining to the question of the unity of one’s subjective experiences, see Marbach (1974), especially chapters 4, 5, 8 and 9. In chapter 6, §26, Gurwitsch’s and Sartre’s views are presented in more detail. — See also Kern (1975), §21 and §35d, in particular. More recently, Kern (1989) has further pursued the question of ‘I’, comparing a phenomenological approach illuminatingly with the Indian-Chinese Buddhist tradition.
See D. Hume (1739) already: “Here then is an idea, which is a medium betwixt unity and number; or more properly speaking, is either of them, according to the view, in which we take it: And this idea we call that of identity. We cannot, in any propriety of speech, say, that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean, that the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at another. By this means we make a difference, betwixt the idea meant by the word, object, and that meant by itself, without going the length of number, and at the same time without restraining ourselves to a strict and absolute unity” (1967, p. 201). I found this reference to Hume in a discussion of the identity of ‘I’ according to the early Schelling in Frank (1985), p. 52.
The exception appears to be the case in which someone’s remembering refers to an event etc. that is believed to have occurred at the very same place that the person now occupies while remembering the event.
See Husserl, manuscript L I 20, p. 4a (1917 or 1918): “... nicht alles Subjektive ist Zeitliches,ist Individuelles, in dem Sinn des durch eine einmalige Zeitstelle Individualisierten. Was wir vor allem nicht im Erlebnisstrom haben, ist das Ich selbst... hier ist nun zu erörtern, dass das Ich als identischer Pol für alle Erlebnisse und für alles in der Intentionalität der Erlebnisse selbst ontisch Beschlossene... der Pol ist für alle Zeitreihen und notwendig als das `über’-zeitlich ist, das Ich, für das sich die Zeit konstituiert, für das Zeitlichkeit, individuell singuläre Gegenständlichkeit in der Intentionalität der Erlebnissphäre da ist, das aber nicht selbst zeitlich ist. In diesem Sinn ist es also nicht `Seiendes’, sondern das Gegenstück für alles Seiende, nicht ein Gegenstand,sondern Urstand für alle Gegenständlichkeit. Das Ich sollte eigentlich nicht heissen, da es dann schon gegenständlich geworden ist. Es ist das namenlos über allem Fassbaren, über allem nicht Stehende, nicht Schwebende, nicht Seiende, sondern `Fungierende’,als fassend, als wertend usw. “See also the discussion on temporality and atemporality of the pure I in Marbach (1974), §28b, where I had already quoted this text (p. 216). — Very interesting related texts can also be found in, e.g., Schelling’s Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus ([1795],1967), p. [320],200, note 1; and in Schelling’s Philosophie der Offenbarung ([1858],1966), where the rather unusual term “Urstand” — that occurs in the Husserl manuscript just quoted — is used and explained in relation to “Verstand” (“understanding”) (p. 296).
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 15b (1912), p. 343.
See Hua IV (1952), Appendix XII (1917), §1: “... Akt ist gleichsam ein Meinen (in einem sehr erweiterten Sinn)... das alles sind Aktverbindungen, die selbst in ihrer oft überwältigenden Implikation Einheit eines Aktes ausmachen und ein gegenständliches Korrelat bewusst machen, das dabei also dem Ich `gegenüber’-steht” (p. 333, emphasis mine).
In an early version of accounting for the intentional achievement of activities of intuitive mental representation Husserl proposed the notion of an “immediate” (“unmittelbare”), a “simple” (“schlichte”), or “pure” (“reine”) representation (“Vergegenwärtigung”); see Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 1 (1904/05), §§37ff.; §42 in particular. But he was soon to abandon this view in favor, precisely, of an account in terms of intentional implication and modification that served as guide in the present study.
See chapter 5 below where the notion of the “double object” will be discussed in detail; see also chapter 6. 3 where, with a brief reference to contemporary work on so-called “mental imagery”, the relationship between activities of pictorially representing and purely mentally representing will be clarified.
This result, in particular, makes it tempting in my view to compare the phenomenological approach to mental representation with some recent interpretations of the classical Aristotelian texts on mind and imagination (see note 24 in this chapter). For an illuminating phenomenological reading of Aristotle on imagination (phantasia) and memory/remembering (mneme and anamnesis), see Kern (1975), §59, p. 398–416 in particular.
See, e.g., Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft,second edition (1787), B376/377; see also Kant’s Logik,edited by G. B. Jäsche, Allgemeine Elementarlehre, Erster Abschnitt. Von den Begriffen, §1. Begriff überhaupt und dessen Unterschied von der Anschauung (1968, p. 91).
See Kern (1975), §41d, “Die Vergegenwärtigung in den sprachlichen Zeichen (die Bedeutung)”; Tugendhat (1982) on “specification” and “identification”, p. 293ff. et passim; compare also p. 154ff.
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 1(1904/05), §§34ff., in particular; Nr. 18 (1918).
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 19 (1922/23), p. 556. Husserl examined these phenomena at length from early on, occasionally terming the variability of represented appearances in activities of imagining or remembering something also as ‘Proteus-like’ (see, e.g., loc. cit., Nr. 1, §§28f.). In his view of the phenomena in question, Husserl was no doubt influenced by Brentano. Brentano, in turn, presented an extensive discussion of the activity of imagination in contrast to perception. In his account he relied on a number of authors, most prominently on the English Empiricists (Hume, Reid, J. Mill, A. Bain and J. St. Mill, especially) in whose writings the question of the vivacity, fullness etc. in imagination and remembering had already been discussed. See, e.g., Brentano (1959), pp. 3–87; Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 1, chapter 5 in particular; Appendix I (1898), §§14, 15 and textcritical notes, pp. 631ff.; Nr. 14 (1911 or 1912); Appendices XXXII and XXXIV (1911 or 1912); Nr. 19 (1922/23). Concerning the historical connection between Husserl and Brentano regarding the topic, see my Introduction in Hua XXIII (1980), pp. XLIIIff.
See, e.g., Hua XXIII (1980), Nr. 14 (1911 or 1912), p. 304: “... Leer-Vergegenwärtigung als Dunkel-Modifikation einer klaren Vergegenwärtigung...”; see also p. 302: “dark acts (representing in a dark manner), that would be a notion of emptiness”; in German: “Dunkle Akte (in dunkler Weise vergegenwärtigende), das wäre ein Begriff von Leere”.
I owe this clarification to Iso Kern who in discussion pointed out that “empty” mental representation is inappropriate for intuitive forms, since some sensible support, something perceivable and hence intuitable such as a word etc., is required anyhow in cases of “emptily” representing something in linguistic manners. Husserl himself seems to be aware of such a perceivable support in an observation that he presents as an example of “emptiness” in the sense of “representing in a dark manner” (see the text quoted in the previous note, p. 302f.).
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Marbach, E. (1993). Phenomenological Forms of Purely Mental Representation. In: Mental Representation and Consciousness. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2239-1_4
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