Abstract
There has been recent criticism of the idea that we humans know about our mental states. In social psychology, for example, forced compliance experiments have produced results that question whether we know why we do what we do. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have shown that subjects in their (non-naturalistic) studies gave reasons for their behaviour that were, some might say regrettably, guided by folk theories. Thus, women who were asked to choose from a table displaying identical pairs of stockings gave as the reason for choosing the stockings they selected that they liked their sheerness, weave and knit — generally accepted standards for assessing the quality of hosiery. The experimenters found, by contrast, that the position of the stockings on the table was the determining factor in their choice. These women thought they knew why they chose a pair of stockings but were merely applying the culture’s folk theoretical explanation for actions that were determined in quite another way.
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigationsg p. 232
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Oatley, K., Larocque, L. (1995). Everyday Concepts of Emotions Following Every-Other-Day Errors in Joint Plans. In: Russell, J.A., Fernández-Dols, JM., Manstead, A.S.R., Wellenkamp, J.C. (eds) Everyday Conceptions of Emotion. NATO ASI Series, vol 81. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8484-5_8
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