Happiness, Life and Quality of Life: A Commentary on Nordenfelt’s ‘Towards a Theory of Happiness’

Abstract

Nordenfelt’s thesis is very clear. His conceptual framework, in which quality of life and happiness-with-life are identified, is rich and well articulated. It can be summarized as follow:

Happiness-with-life is a positive human experience (it is, in fact, “a species of well-being of the second order” p. 40) with the whole life as an object. It is important to note that, in order for an experience to be positive, the object must be thought to be something good (p. 40). Happiness is clearly dependent on the goal-setting of the individuals, so that it is impossible to give a description of the emotional condition of a person simply by describing his external states of affair: in fact, this states, according to Nordenfelt, can be defined as welfare if, and only if, they contribute to that person’s well-being (the relation is logical, not empirical). Happiness is then defined as an emotion deriving from the equilibrium between a person’s wants and his conditions in life as he perceives them (happiness as equilibrium). Happiness has also a richness dimension, depending on the expansion of the set of wants that are satisfied. Nordenfelt concludes that happiness, and therefore quality of life, are subjectivist notions, whose measurement is very difficult, if not impossible.