Notes on the History of the Philosophy of Science

Abstract

Anyone who has made an effort to make a contribution to the history of the philosophy of science has been faced from the outset with a number of difficult problems. One of these problems is concerned with the relationship between philosophy and science. Are they inherently different human enterprises? If so, how then are they to be related to each other? If they are not inherently different enterprises, why and how are they then still to be differentiated? This problem is important not only for the manner in which philosophers understand the meaning and function of philosophy, but also for the manner in which they conceive of the task of philosophy in regard to the sciences. In the twentieth century phenomenologists have tried to defend and develop the first alternative mentioned, whereas logical empiricists and positivists usually have opted for the second alternative. I myself favor the first alternative, also, and in another chapter of this book I hope to present reasons why I am convinced that this is the correct position to take. To substantiate my view in greater detail I have explicitly added a chapter on the meaning and function of philosophy in circler to “lay the ‘foundation” for further reflections on the natural sciences.

Article Footnote

From Philosophy of Science: The Historical Background, edited by Joseph J. Kockelmans. Copyright © 1968 by The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan, Inc. Reprinted and edited with the permission of the publisher.