Abstract
Examining the record of past research from the vantage of contemporary historiography, the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. It is rather as if the professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well. Of course, nothing of quite that sort does occur: there is no geographical transplantation; outside the laboratory everyday affairs usually continue as before. Nevertheless, paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research-engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world.
Chapter X of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, by Thomas S. Kuhn.
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Notes
For examples, see Albert H. Hastorf, The Influence of Suggestion on the Relationship between Stimulus Size and Perceived Distance’, Journal of Psychology XXIX (1950), 195–217; and Jerome S. Bruner, Leo Postman, and John Rodrigues, ‘Expectations and the Perception of Color’, American Journal of Psychology LXIV (1951), 216–27.
For examples, see Albert H. Hastorf, The Influence of Suggestion on the Relationship between Stimulus Size and Perceived Distance’, Journal of Psychology XXIX (1950), 195–217; and Jerome S. Bruner, Leo Postman, and John Rodrigues, ‘Expectations and the Perception of Color’, American Journal of Psychology LXIV (1951), 216–27.
N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge, 1958, Chapter i.
Peter Doig, A Concise History of Astronomy, London, 1950, pp. 115–16.
Rudolph Wolf, Geschichte der Astronomie, Munich, 1877, pp. 513–15, 683–93. Notice particularly how difficult Wolf’s account makes it to explain these discoveries as a consequence of Bode’s Law.
683–93. Notice particularly how difficult Wolf’s account makes it to explain these discoveries as a consequence of Bode’s Law.
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, III, Cambridge, 1959, 423–29, 434–36.
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, III, Cambridge, 1959, 423–29, 434–36.
T. S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, pp. 206–9.
Duane Roller and Duane H. D. Roller, The Development of the Concept of Electric Charge, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, pp. 21–29.
Galileo Galilei, Dialogues concerning Two New Sciences, trans, by H. Crew and A. de Salvio, Evanston, III., 1946, pp. 80–81,162–66.
Galileo Galilei, Dialogues concerning Two New Sciences, trans, by H. Crew and A. de Salvio, Evanston, III., 1946, pp. 80–81,162–66.
M. Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, Madison, Wis., 1959, pp. 537–38, 570.
T. S. Kuhn, ‘A Function for Thought Experiments’, in Mélanges Alexandre Koyre, ed. R. Taton and I. B. Cohen, to be published by Hermann, Paris, in 1963.
A. Koyré, Etudes Galileennes, Paris, 1939, I, 46–51; and ‘Galileo and Plato’, Journal of the History of Ideas IV (1943), 400–428.
A. Koyré, Etudes Galileennes, Paris, 1939, I, 46–51; and ‘Galileo and Plato’, Journal of the History of Ideas IV (1943), 400–428.
Kuhn, ‘A Function for Thought Experiments’, in Melanges Alexandre Koyre (see n. 14 for full citation).
H. Metzger, Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique, Paris, 1930, pp. 34–68.
Ibid., pp. 124–29, 139–48. For Dalton, see Leonard K. Nash, The Atomic-Molecular Theory, ‘Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science’, Case 4; Cambridge, Mass., 1950, pp. 14–21.
Ibid., pp. 124–29, 139–48. For Dalton, see Leonard K. Nash, The Atomic-Molecular Theory, ‘Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science’, Case 4; Cambridge, Mass., 1950, pp. 14–21.
Ibid., pp. 124–29, 139–48. For Dalton, see Leonard K. Nash, The Atomic-Molecular Theory, ‘Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science’, Case 4; Cambridge, Mass., 1950, pp. 14–21.
J. R. Partington, A Short History of Chemistry, 2d ed.; London, 1951, pp. 161–63.
A. N. Meldrum, The Development of the Atomic Theory: (1) Berthollet’s Doctrine of Variable Proportions’, Manchester Memoirs LIV (1910), 1–16.
L. K. Nash, ‘The Origin of Dalton’s Chemical Atomic Theory’, Isis XLVH (1956), 101–16.
A. N. Meldrum, ‘The Development of the Atomic Theory: (6) The Reception Accorded to the Theory Advocated by Dalton’, Manchester Memoirs LV (1911), 1–10.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Kuhn, T.S. (1976). Scientific Revolutions as Changes of World View. In: Harding, S.G. (eds) Can Theories be Refuted?. Synthese Library, vol 81. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_9
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