Abstract
It is a basic principle of contemporary empiricism that a sentence makes a cognitively significant assertion, and thus can be said to be either true or false, if and only if either (1) it is analytic or contradictory — in which case it is said to have purely logical meaning or significance — or else (2) it is capable, at least potentially, of test by experiential evidence — in which case it is said to have empirical meaning or significance. The basic tenet of this principle, and especially of its second part, the so-called testability criterion of empirical meaning (or better: meaningfulness), is not peculiar to empiricism alone: it is characteristic also of contemporary operationism, and in a sense of pragmatism as well; for the pragmatist maxim that a difference must make a difference to be a difference may well be construed as insisting that a verbal difference between two sentences must make a difference in experiential implications if it is to reflect a difference in meaning.
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© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Hempel, C.G. (1976). Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes. In: Harding, S.G. (eds) Can Theories be Refuted?. Synthese Library, vol 81. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_3
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