Abstract
A number of empirically-minded philosophers hold that there is a class of ‘basic’ (or ‘protocol’) sentences each of which is, in the words of Karl Popper, “a statement of singular fact” ([3], p. 43). Many of these philosophers also maintain, with Popper, that there are empirical theories which are ‘falsifiable’ in the sense that each such theory
divides the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two nonempty subclasses. First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it rules out, or prohibits) secondly, the class of those basic statements which it does not contradict (or which it ‘permits’) ([3], p. 86).
From Philosophy of Science (1969). Reprinted by permission.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Duhem, P.: The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (trans, by Philip P. Wiener), Atheneum, New York, 1962.
Grünbaum, A.: Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1963.
Popper, Karl R.: The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Science Editions, New York, 1961.
Quine, W. V. O.: ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in From a Logical Point of View, Harper and Row, New York, 1963, pp. 20–46.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1976 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Wedeking, G. (1976). Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification. In: Harding, S.G. (eds) Can Theories be Refuted?. Synthese Library, vol 81. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0630-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1863-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive