Abstract
Material reductionism – the prevailing metaphysical view that reality can be understood entirely in terms of non-conscious physical stuff – is at odds with the existence of experience, the flow of time, and the privileged present. We propose an alternative scientifically-grounded metaphysical perspective that posits: (1) Consciousness represents a fundamental aspect of reality such that all material things enjoy some varying degree of consciousness (panpsychism); (2) nervous systems entail a nested hierarchy of distinct conscious observers; (3) both experience and the flow of time suggest the reality of a subjective realm of existence; (4) the flow of time suggests a process by which all observers collectively sample segments of continuous space/time at different rates, creating a composite of experienced moments of varying thickness; (5) the possibility that consciousness can influence the duration and selection of experienced moments affords a possible opportunity for genuine free will. Although speculative, these conjectures illustrate the type of alternative metaphysics that may be able to accommodate scientific observations without abandoning the self-evident facts that experience exists and time flows.
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Notes
- 1.
How phenomenal experience fits into this model has been a source of some consternation. In some places Dennett seems to suggest that phenomenal experience is just an illusion (Dennett 1991) and indeed many have interpreted him in this way (e.g. Searle 1990). In other places, however, he insists that we are conscious (Dennet 1997). Given that Dennett consistently denies that subjective experience offers any privileged information a critical question arises for him, namely, how it is that he knows that he is conscious.
- 2.
Hunt parts ways with the Schoolers on the ideas in this section due to its postulation of an ontological distinction between information and physical/reality, see Afterword.
- 3.
Hunt parts ways with the Schoolers on this section due to its endorsement of a block universe model of physical reality, and its suggestion of an ontological distinction between subjective and objective time (see Afterword).
- 4.
In this regard is notable that information theory specifically requires that observations proceed in discrete steps rather than being continuous. As Turing observes “It is easy to show using standard theory that if a system starts in an eigenstate of some observable, and measurements are made of that observable N times a second, then, even if the state is not a stationary one, the probability that the system will be in the same state after, say, one second, tends to one as N tends to infinity; that is, that continual observations will prevent motion …” Alan Turing quoted in Teuscher 2003 (p. 54)
- 5.
We note that this account shares some at least superficial similarity with the physicist Lynd’s (2003) discussions of the relationship between subjective and physical instantiations of time. Lynd observes “there is not a precise static instant in time underlying a dynamical physical process… it is the human observer who subjectively projects, imposes and assigns a precise instant in time upon a physical process, for example, in order to gain a meaningful subjective picture or “mental snapshot” of the relative position of a body in relative motion” (p. 2).
- 6.
We thank Rachel Schooler for this observation.
- 7.
Striking evidence from binocular rivalry studies (in which competing images are presented to each eye) suggest that while the magnitude of such synchronizations is greatest for the reported percept, synchronization is also associated with the image that is not currently being reported (Srinivasan et al. 2009). This suggests that in binocular rivalry experiments, a conscious experience of both images is maintained in the visual system and reflected by distinct coherent patterns of oscillation associated with each. However, at any one time only one of those conscious experiences is integrated into the higher order experience associated with the observer that is capable of verbal report.
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Acknowledgments
We are grateful to many individuals for their input and assistance with this chapter. Ben Baird provided comments on numerous drafts and assisted with references. The ideas presented here were helpfully refined by discussions with many people, none of whom should be assumed to endorse the resulting product. These include: Daniel Povinelli, Merrill McSpadden, Carmi Schooler, Lael Schooler, Rachel Schooler, Nina Schooler, Roy Baumeister, Daniel Gilbert, Daniel Dennett, Mark Laufer, Jonathan Smallwood, Christine Tipper, Dianne Tice, Thomas Nadelhofer, and Harvey Bottelsen. The writing of this chapter was supported by grants from the James Bower Foundation and the Bial Foundation.
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Schooler, J.W., Hunt, T., Schooler, J.N. (2011). Reconsidering the Metaphysics of Science from the Inside Out. In: Walach, H., Schmidt, S., Jonas, W. (eds) Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality. Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2079-4_11
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