Abstract
Much recent research on moral judgment making has focused on quick one-shot judgments. Explicit reasoning has been shown to play a minor role in these cases. However, these results do not generalize to real moral conduct that often includes the iterative adaptation of long-term behavioral strategies. I suggest using school bullying as an ecologically valid model for moral conduct and refer to studies that show that moral reasoning competence is negatively correlated to immoral aggressive behavior. Taken together, these results suggest a rather strict division of labor between reasoning on the one hand and automatic processes on the other hand. I suggest that moral reasoning is part of a long-term learning process, which sets the parameters for quick intuitive decision making. Philosophical ethics can play an important role by systematizing and reflecting this learning process.
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Grundherr, M. (2016). Moral Argumentation Skills and Aggressive Behavior. Implications for Philosophical Ethics. In: Brand, C. (eds) Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-12053-5_6
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