Abstract
It is argued in this contribution that applied ethics has to incorporate sociological and psychological data and theories in order to do the work it is expected to do. The necessity of taking into account empirical facts arises, first, from the necessity to assess the impact of its own principles on the concrete realities, which these principles are to influence. Second, it arises from the necessity to adapt the practice rules proposed to the norms and attitudes prevalent in their respective contexts of application with a view to prospects of acceptance, motivation, and forestalling of 'slippery slopes'. It is argued that this necessity holds alike for foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches in applied ethics as well as (though with significant differences) for consequentialist and deontological basic principles. The relevance of empirical hypotheses for some of the perennial problems of applied ethics is shown in an exemplary way by the role played by empirical theories in the relation between utility maximization and (seemingly) independent criteria of distributive justice.
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Birnbacher, D. (2016). Where and When Ethics Needs Empirical Facts. In: Brand, C. (eds) Dual-Process Theories in Moral Psychology. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-12053-5_2
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