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Our Concept of Time

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Philosophy and Psychology of Time

Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind ((SIBM,volume 9))

Abstract

In this chapter we argue that our concept of time is a functional concept. We argue that our concept of time is such that time is whatever it is that plays the time role, and we spell out what we take the time role to consist in. We evaluate this proposal against a number of other analyses of our concept of time, and argue that it better explains various features of our dispositions as speakers and our practices as agents.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Internalist views of this stripe are defended by, inter alia, Jackson (1998, 2004, 2007, 2009), Chalmers (2004), Braddon-Mitchell (2004a, b, 2005, 2009), and Pettit (2004).

  2. 2.

    See for instance Zimmerman (2005).

  3. 3.

    The B-theory- -> is typically supplemented with an account of tensed talk and thought. The A-theorist takes tensed thought and talk to pick out A-theoretic properties. The B-theorist takes tensed thought and talk to be indexical, picking out the time at which a proposition is expressed either in speech or via some doxastic state.

  4. 4.

    For instance, Putnam (1967), Schmidt (2006), and Deng (2013).

  5. 5.

    McTaggart (1908) and Gödel (1949).

  6. 6.

    A two-place operator Rxy is commutative just when for any a and b such that Rab, Rab if and only if Rba.

  7. 7.

    This account of canonical quantization is taken from Fradkin (ms., 92) . For a more detailed (and more technically demanding) overview of canonical quantum gravity, see Isham (1993). See Kuchař (1992) for a more accessible, philosophical overview.

  8. 8.

    Notice that it is consistent with what we say, here, about our concept of time, that it is metaphysically impossible for any world to seem the way our world seems, and to lack an A-series. Perhaps the A-theorist is right, and the A-series is necessary to produce our phenomenology of time. Then it turns out that time is A-theoretic. But this is not a conceptual truth: our concept of time does not demand any such thing.

  9. 9.

    The details vary depending on the particulars of the account.

  10. 10.

    Stalnaker (2002), Hawthorne (2002), and Braddon-Mitchell (2003).

  11. 11.

    Paper presented at the Frontiers in the Philosophy of Time- -> Conference, Kyoto, Japan.

  12. 12.

    With thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell in discussion.

  13. 13.

    Something along these lines has been suggested by Craig Bourne (2006, 220–222) à la Lewis (1970) in the context of discussion about our concept of time.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Humanities, University of Western Australia Crawley, Perth, Western Australia, 6009, Australia

    Samuel Baron

  2. Department of Philosophy, Quadrangle A14, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia

    Kristie Miller

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  1. Samuel Baron
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Correspondence to Samuel Baron .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

    Bruno Mölder

  2. Department of Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, University of Turku, Turku, Finland

    Valtteri Arstila

  3. Department of Communication and Psychology, University of Aalborg, Aalborg, Denmark

    Peter Øhrstrøm

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Baron, S., Miller, K. (2016). Our Concept of Time. In: Mölder, B., Arstila, V., Øhrstrøm, P. (eds) Philosophy and Psychology of Time. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22195-3_3

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