Skip to main content

What Is Knowledge? Who Creates It? Who Possesses It? The Need for Novel Answers to Old Questions

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Mass Collaboration and Education

Part of the book series: Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning Series ((CULS,volume 16))

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of both traditional and more recent conceptualizations of knowledge. It also aims at identifying shortcomings of each of these conceptualizations in the context of mass collaboration. Philosophy has traditionally conceptualized knowledge as “justified true belief,” whereas psychology tends to consider it mainly in terms of semantic memory. What both traditions have in common, however, is an individualistic focus, which emphasizes that knowledge is located within people’s minds. But this individual perspective reaches its limits when considering transpersonal phenomena like collaborative knowledge construction and mass collaboration. More recent approaches have taken social aspects of knowledge-related processes into account. We present some of them briefly and discuss them with regard to mass collaboration settings. Finally, we present a systemic view of knowledge as an attempt toward a synthesis of individualistic and social perspectives, which might be more suitable for mass collaboration scenarios.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    It must be acknowledged, however, that the branch of mathematics has been granted a special role even in traditional epistemology. This is due to the fact that mathematical knowledge is generated by stringent and complete proof. Such knowledge has therefore been proposed to be “a priori” (e.g., Peressini, 2008; Womack, 1993). As such, it may be regarded to be independent of any individuals recognizing it. This particular concept is closely linked to Popper’s third world (see below).

  2. 2.

    An epistemic system is thus by definition a social system, not an individual system.

References

  • Adler, J. (2010). Epistemological problems of testimony. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2010 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/

  • Alkin, M. C. (1992). Encyclopedia of educational research (6th ed.). New York, NY: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alston, W. P. (1988). The deontological conception of epistemic justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 257–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ballard, P. B. (1913). Oblivescence and reminiscence. British Journal of Psychology, 1(No. 2, Monograph Supplements), Preface-82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bar-Tal, D., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1988). The social psychology of knowledge. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bereiter, C. & Scardamalia, M. (2010). Can children really create knowledge? Canadian Journal of Learning and Technology, 36(1). Retrieved from http://www.cjlt.ca/index.php/cjlt/article/view/585/289

  • Boghossian, P. A. (2006). Fear of knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism. Oxford, England: Clarendon.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Caramazza, A., McCloskey, M., & Green, B. (1981). Naïve beliefs in “sophisticated” subjects: Misconceptions about the trajectories of objects. Cognition, 9, 117–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cress, U., Feinkohl, I., Jirschitzka, J., & Kimmerle, J. (2016). Mass collaboration as co-evolution of cognitive and social systems. In U. Cress, J. Moskaliuk, & H. Jeong (Eds.), Mass collaboration and education. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cress, U., & Kimmerle, J. (2008). A systemic and cognitive view on collaborative knowledge building with wikis. International Journal of Computer Supported Collaborative Learning, 3, 105–122.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Damşa, C. I., Kirschner, P. A., Andriessen, J. E. B., Erkens, G., & Sins, P. H. M. (2010). Shared epistemic agency: An empirical study of an emergent construct. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 19, 143–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • David, M. (2013). The correspondence theory of truth. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/

  • Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (1999). A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 735–808.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dunn, J. C. (2004). Remember—know: A matter of confidence. Psychological Review, 2004(111), 524–542.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ebbinghaus, H. (1964). Memory (H. A. Ruger & C. E. Bussenius, Trans.). New York, NY: Dover (Original work published 1885).

    Google Scholar 

  • Erdelyi, M. H. (2010). The ups and downs of memory. American Psychologist, 65, 623–633.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Faulkner, P. (2006). Understanding knowledge transmission. Ratio, 19, 156–175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 15–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fiedler, K., Russer, S., & Gramm, K. (1993). Illusory correlations and memory performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 111–136.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fleck, L. (1935). Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv [The genesis and development of a scientific fact]. Basel, Switzerland: Schwabe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gardiner, J. M. (1988). Functional aspects of recollective experience. Memory & Cognition, 16, 309–313.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23, 121–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Giere, R. N., & Moffatt, B. (2003). Distributed cognition: Where the cognitive and the social merge. Social Studies of the Science, 33, 301–310.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Fast and frugal heuristics: The tools of bounded rationality. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 62–88). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahnemann, D. (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. Cambridge, England: University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge. Boston, MA: D. Reidel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1987). Foundations of social epistemics. Synthese, 73, 109–144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (2010). Systems-oriented social epistemology. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (vol. 3). Retrieved from http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/goldman/Systems-Oriented%20Social%20Epistemology.pdf

  • Goldman, A., & Blanchard, T. (2010). Social epistemology. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2010 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/

  • Greco, J. & Turri, J. (2011). Virtue epistemology. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2011 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/

  • Greenwald, A. G. (1975). Consequences of prejudice against the null hypothesis. Psychological Bulletin, 82, 1–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Griffith, A. K., & Preston, K. R. (1992). Grade-12 students’ misconceptions relating to fundamental characteristics of atoms and molecules. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29, 611–628.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gruber, T. (2011). Gedächtnis—Lehrbuch Basiswissen Psychologie. Wiesbaden, Germany: VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardwig, J. (1985). Epistemic dependence. The Journal of Philosophy, 82, 335–349.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Higgins, E. T., & Rholes, W. S. (1978). “Saying is believing”: Effects of message modification on memory and liking for the person described. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 363–378.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hinsz, V. B., Tindale, R. S., & Vollrath, D. A. (1997). The emerging conceptualization of groups as information processors. Psychological Bulletin, 121, 43–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hirst, W., & Manier, D. (2008). Towards a psychology of collective memory. Memory, 16, 183–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ichikawa, J. J. & Steup, M. (2014). The analysis of knowledge. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2014 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/

  • Kerr, N. L., MacCoun, R. J., & Kramer, G. P. (1996). Biases in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups. Psychological Review, 103, 687–719.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimmerle, J., Cress, U., & Held, C. (2010). The interplay between individual and collective knowledge: Technologies for organisational learning and knowledge building. Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 8, 33–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimmerle, J., Gerbing, K.-K., Cress, U., & Thiel, A. (2012). Exchange of complementary and alternative medical knowledge in sport-related Internet fora. Sociology of Sport Journal, 29, 348–364.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kimmerle, J., Moskaliuk, J., Cress, U., & Thiel, A. (2011). A systems theoretical approach to online knowledge building. AI & Society: Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Communication, 26, 49–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimmerle, J., Moskaliuk, J., Harrer, A., & Cress, U. (2010). Visualizing co-evolution of individual and collective knowledge. Information, Communication and Society, 13, 1099–1121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimmerle, J., Moskaliuk, J., Oeberst, A., & Cress, U. (2015). Learning and collective knowledge construction with social media: A process-oriented perspective. Educational Psychologist, 50, 120–137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, P. (1990). The division of cognitive labor. The Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klemke, E. D. (1979). Karl Popper, objective knowledge, and the third world. Philosophia, 9, 45–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klimoski, R., & Mohammed, S. (1994). Team mental model: Construct or metaphor? Journal of Management, 20, 403–437.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knorr-Cetina, K. (1981). The manufacture of knowledge: An essay on the constructivist and contextual nature of science. New York, NY: Pergamon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kusch, M. (2002a). Testimony in communitarian epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 33, 335–354.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kusch, M. (2002b). Knowledge by agreement: The programme of communitarian epistemology. Oxford, England: University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth in knowledge. London, England: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Larson, J. R., Jr., & Christensen, C. (1993). Groups as problem-solving units: Toward a new meaning of social cognition. British Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 5–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lehrer, K. (1987). Personal and social knowledge. Synthese, 73, 87–107.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lindner, I., Echterhoff, G., Davidson, P. S. R., & Brand, M. (2010). Observation inflation: Your actions become mine. Psychological Science, 21, 1291–1299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Luhmann, N. (1984). Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie [Social systems. Outline of a general theory]. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luhmann, N. (1990). Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft [Science as a social system]. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maier, J., & Richter, T. (2014). Verstehen multipler Texte zu kontroversen wissenschaftlichen Themen: Die Rolle der epistemischen Validierung. Unterrichtswissenschaft, 42, 24–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mandl, H. & Spada, H. (1988). Wissenspsychologie [The Psychology of Knowledge]. Weinheim, Germany: Beltz.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matthiessen, H. O., & Willaschek, M. (2009). Epistemische Rechtfertigung. In H. J. Sandkühler (Ed.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie (3rd ed.). Hamburg, Germany: Meiner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1987). The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding. Boston, MA: New Science Library/Shambhala Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moskaliuk, J., Kimmerle, J., & Cress, U. (2009). Wiki-supported learning and knowledge building: Effects of incongruity between knowledge and information. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 25, 549–561.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moussavi, F., & Evans, D. A. (1993). Emergence of organizational attributions: The role of a shared cognitive schema. Journal of Management, 19, 79–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oeberst, A. (2012). If anything else comes to mind… better keep it to yourself? Delayed recall is discrediting—unjustifiably. Law and Human Behavior, 36, 266–274.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oeberst, A., & Blank, H. (2012). Undoing suggestive influence on memory: The reversibility of the misinformation effect. Cognition, 125, 141–159.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oeberst, A., Halatchliyski, I., Kimmerle, J., & Cress, U. (2014). Knowledge construction in Wikipedia: A systemic-constructivist analysis. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 23, 149–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paalova, S., & Hakkarainen, K. (2005). The knowledge creation metaphor—An emergent epistemological approach to learning. Science & Education, 14, 535–557.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pappas, G. (2009). Internalist vs. externalist conceptions of epistemic justification. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2009 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/

  • Peressini, A. (2008). Proof, reliability, and mathematical knowledge. Theoria, 69, 211–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 123–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piaget, J. (1977). The development of thought: Equilibration of cognitive structures. New York, NY: Viking.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pohl, R. F. (2004). Cognitive illusions: A handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory. Hove, England: Psychology Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1968). Epistemology without a knowing subject. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, 52, 333–373.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1970). Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde [The open society and its enemies]. Bern, Switzerland: Francke.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Oxford, England: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R. (1978). Three worlds: The Tanner lecture on human values. Lecture delivered at the University of Michigan, April 7, 1978. Retrieved from http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/p/popper80.pdf

  • Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of “meaning”. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, 131–193.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reber, R., & Unckelbach, C. (2010). The epistemic status of processing fluency as source for judgments of truth. Review of Philosophical Psychology, 1, 563–581.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Resnick, L. B., Levine, J. M., & Teasley, S. D. (Eds.). (1991). Perspectives on socially shared cognition. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richter, T. (2003). Epistemologische Einschätzungen beim Textverstehen [Epistemological evaluations in text understanding]. Lengerich, Germany: Pabst.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11, 108–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Salomon, G. (Ed.). (1993). Distributed cognitions. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scardamalia, M. & Bereiter, C. (2010). A brief history of knowledge building. Canadian Journal of Learning and Technology, 36(1). Retrieved from http://www.cjlt.ca/index.php/cjlt/article/view/574/276

  • Schiffer, S. (1996). Contextualist solutions to skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 96, 317–333.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schroeder, S., Richter, T., & Hoever, I. (2008). Getting a picture that is both accurate and stable: Situation models and epistemic validation. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 237–255.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shaw, J., & Porter, S. (2015). Constructing rich false memories of committing crime. Psychological Science. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/0956797614562862

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperling, M., & Schmidt, T. (2009). Allgemeine Psychologie kompakt—Wahrnehmung, Aufmerksamkeit, Sprache, Denken. Weinheim, Germany: Beltz.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sporer, S. L., Penrod, S. D., Read, J. D., & Cutler, B. L. (1995). Choosing, confidence, and accuracy: A meta-analysis of the confidence-accuracy relation in eyewitness identification studies. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 315–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steck, P., Hermanutz, M., Lafrenz, B., Schwind, D., Hettler, S., Maier, B., & Geiger, S. (2010). Die psychometrische Qualität von Realkennzeichen [Psychometric characteristics of the criteria based content analysis]. Retrieved from http://serwiss.bib.hs-hannover.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/263

  • Steffens, M. C., & Mecklenbräuker, S. (2007). False memories. Phenomena, theories, and implications. Journal of Psychology, 215, 12–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, L., & Fine, G. A. (1999). Socially shared cognition, affect, and behavior: A review and integration. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 278–302.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tulving, E. (1985a). How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist, 40, 385–398.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tulving, E. (1985b). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology, 25, 1–12.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tulving, E. (1987). Multiple memory systems and consciousness. Human Neurobiology, 6, 67–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tulving, E. (1989). Memory: Performance, knowledge, and experience. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 1, 3–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vahid, H. (1998). Deontic vs. nondeontic conceptions of epistemic justification. Erkenntnis, 49, 285–301.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vicente, K. J., & Brewer, W. F. (1993). Reconstructive remembering of the scientific literature. Cognition, 46, 101–128.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • von Foerster, H. (2003). Understanding understanding: Essays on cybernetics and cognition. New York, NY: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vygotsky, L. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wegner, D. M., Erber, R., & Raymond, P. (1991). Transactive memory in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 923–929.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, R. A., & Keil, F. C. (1999). The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Womack, C. A. (1993). The crucial role of proof: A classical defense against mathematical empiricism. Doctoral Dissertation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Retrieved from http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/12678

  • Wood, J. M., & Nezworski, M. T. (2005). Science as a history of corrected mistakes. American Psychologist, 60, 657–658.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Aileen Oeberst .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Oeberst, A., Kimmerle, J., Cress, U. (2016). What Is Knowledge? Who Creates It? Who Possesses It? The Need for Novel Answers to Old Questions. In: Cress, U., Moskaliuk, J., Jeong, H. (eds) Mass Collaboration and Education. Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning Series, vol 16. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13536-6_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13536-6_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13535-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13536-6

  • eBook Packages: EducationEducation (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics