Abstract
While traditional conceptions of theoretical psychology focus on epistemological and methodological aspects of psychological theories, recent approaches tend to include social, moral, and practical issues. However, whether defined in narrower or broader terms, contemporary views of theoretical and philosophical psychology have little room for the history of psychology. In this chapter, I argue that it plays an essential role in theoretical psychology, by making the theoretical psychologist aware of at least two things: the historical contingency of the very idea of theoretical psychology, and the persistent philosophical problems that underlie psychological science. To illustrate my thesis, I propose a two-layered approach in which the history of psychology plays a double role in theoretical psychology: it offers an immediate context for contemporary proposals and a deep connection with the long development of psychology. I conclude that the history of psychology is vital for re-envisioning theoretical and philosophical psychology.
I would like to thank Barbara Held, James Lamiell, and Lisa Osbeck for helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript, and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) for financial support.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Both societies promote annual or biannual meetings; all three journals have high submission and rejection rates; and the series is going to its sixteenth volume. It should be added here the 8-volume set on theoretical psychology, recently published by Sage (Stam, 2012a).
- 2.
- 3.
It is interesting to note that, about 50 years before, Gustav Bergmann had already drawn attention to the low level of theorization in psychology (Bergmann, 1953).
- 4.
A good example of how this can affect the relation between the history of psychology and psychology within universities is given by Alan Collins and Geoff Bunn (2016). Although their focus is on the British case, it is happening to a greater or lesser extent almost everywhere. Ultimately, one can say that this specific problem is closely related to the so-called “crisis in the humanities” debate (e.g., Bate, 2011; Nussbaum, 2016; Small, 2013).
- 5.
- 6.
It is true that theoretical psychology has been sometimes conceived of as primarily related to theory construction and evaluation (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2010; Longuet-Higgins, 1982; Madsen, 1985; Royce, 1978; Valsiner, 2015). It might be argued, then, that theory construction involves also first-order analyses, in which case TPP would not be a purely metatheoretical enterprise. Even in that case, however, it must be assumed that theory construction involves constant second-order reflection, such as judgements about the adequacy of epistemological assumptions to validate certain empirical data.
- 7.
Karl Madsen, for example, states this very clearly: “the history of psychology and other empirical studies of psychology … do not belong to theoretical psychology unless their purpose is … to contribute to psychological metatheory” (Madsen, 1985, p. 9). He does not say, though, how this contribution might happen.
- 8.
It is not a coincidence that the American Psychological Association has two separated divisions—one for TPP (Division 24) and one for the history of psychology (Division 26)—with little interaction. However, even if this were not the case, a mere institutional arrangement does not guarantee intellectual collaboration and exchange, which is exactly my point here. This is not to say that there is no recognition at all of a potential role for the history of psychology in TPP. For example, Teo (2015b) addresses the issue of how historical thinking in general can be used as a tool for theoretical psychology, by focusing on the topic of objectivity. In the same vein, Valsiner (2015) claims that the history of psychology can serve as “a tool of reflexivity—focused on the past, but oriented to the future” (p. 45). Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that most of the programmatic writings for a theoretical psychology envisage at best a loose place for the history of psychology.
- 9.
In this paper, I am using the terms ‘philosophy of psychology,’ ‘theoretical psychology,’ and ‘theoretical and philosophical psychology’ interchangeably, to refer to a broad reflection about the theoretical foundations of psychology. Although I recognize that these terms can and should be more narrowly defined in other contexts, this is irrelevant for my present purposes.
- 10.
This preparatory work is to be understood as the application of his theory of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie) to psychology. For instance, Wundt accepted the concept of ‘mind’ (Seele) in psychology, but gave it a new definition, avoiding traditional metaphysical commitments (e.g., mind as a substance). The same is valid for his principle of psychophysical parallelism (e.g., Wundt, 1911). For a detailed discussion of the relation between Wundt’s psychology and his philosophical assumptions, see Araujo (2016).
- 11.
It should be also noted that, in a prescient essay, Wundt (1913) warned against the damaging consequences for the psychologist of an institutional and intellectual divorce between psychology and philosophy. He predicted, for example, that psychologists would gradually lose the ability to recognize and/or deal effectively with conceptual problems. According to James Lamiell (2013), this is exactly what has happened in contemporary psychology.
- 12.
Arguing for the importance of the history of science for philosophy in general, Gary Hatfield (1996) shows how contemporary appraisals of modern philosophers tend to distort and erase the context of their relationship with science. For him, “deep engagement with intellectual history and the history of science is a necessary condition for reading the texts of theoretical philosophy. Here, the history of science as a discipline can guide us methodologically, for we can learn to emulate the best history of science by looking to predecessors first in establishing textual contexts, by relying on primary sources to establish the most important contexts, and by reading widely, as opposed to jumping from ‘great’ to ‘great’” (Hatfield, 1996, p. 131). I think the same goes for the relation between the history of psychology and TPP.
- 13.
That neuroscience is not incompatible in principle with psychology can be seen in recent attempts to integrate them (e.g., Machamer & Sytsma, 2007; Schwartz, Lilienfeld, Meca, & Sauvigné, 2016). However, this, too, is something to be learned from the history of psychology (e.g., James, 1890/1981; Wundt, 1911).
- 14.
In his De Anima, Aristotle drew attention to logical problems arising from materialistic attempts to explain the psyche through the body or some of its parts (Aristotle, 1995). According to Michael Bennett and Peter Hacker, contemporary cognitive neuroscience repeats the same pattern of logical mistakes: “the mereological fallacy,” as they call it (Bennett & Hacker, 2003).
- 15.
The same point equally applies to the case of mental measurement and statistical procedures. For example, Joel Michell (1999) claims that contemporary psychometrics—despite its practical dissemination in society—is grounded on flawed theoretical assumptions that are also related to a lack of historical perspective. By the same token, Lamiell (2015) shows how history can help us identify conceptual problems underlying the use of population-level statistical knowledge in contemporary psychology. I think this comes close to what Gigerenzer (2004) called “mindless statistics,” the substitution of statistical rituals for statistical thinking.
References
Arabatzis, T. (2016). The structure of scientific revolutions and history and philosophy of science in historical perspective. In A. Blum, K. Gavroglu, C. Joas, & J. Renn (Eds.), Shifting paradigms: Thomas Kuhn and the history of science (pp. 191–201). Berlin: Edition Open Access.
Araujo, S. F. (2012). Materialism’s eternal return: Recurrent patterns of materialistic explanations of mental phenomena. In A. Moreira-Almeida & F. S. Santos (Eds.), Exploring frontiers of the mind-brain relationship (pp. 3–15). New York: Springer.
Araujo, S. F. (2016). Wundt and the philosophical foundations of psychology: A reappraisal. New York: Springer.
Araujo, S. F. (2017a). Toward a philosophical history of psychology: An alternative path for the future. Theory & Psychology, 27(1), 87–107.
Araujo, S. F. (2017b). On methodological pluralism, context, and misinterpretation in the historiography of psychology: A reply to Brock and Burman. Theory & Psychology, 27(3), 426–433.
Aristotle. (1995). De Anima. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of Aristotle (Vol. 1, pp. 641–692). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ash, M. (1983). The self-presentation of a discipline: History of psychology in the United States between pedagogy and scholarship. In L. Graham, W. Lepenies, & P. Weingart (Eds.), Functions and uses of disciplinary histories (pp. 143–189). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Bate, J. (Ed.). (2011). The public value of the humanities. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Bennett, M., & Hacker, P. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Bergmann, G. (1940a). On some methodological problems of psychology. Philosophy of Science, 7(2), 205–219.
Bergmann, G. (1940b). The subject matter of psychology. Philosophy of Science, 7(4), 415–433.
Bergmann, G. (1943). Psychoanalysis and experimental psychology: A review from the standpoint of scientific empiricism. Mind, 52(206), 122–140.
Bergmann, G. (1951). The logic of psychological concepts. Philosophy of Science, 18(2), 93–110.
Bergmann, G. (1953). Theoretical psychology. Annual Review of Psychology, 4, 435–458.
Brock, A. (2016). The universal and the particular in psychology and the role of history in explaining both. In S. H. Klempe & R. Smith (Eds.), Centrality of history for theory construction in psychology (pp. 29–46). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. (Annals of Theoretical Psychology 14).
Butterfield, H. (1965). The Whig interpretation of history. New York: Norton & Company. (Original work published 1935).
Collins, A., & Bunn, G. (2016). The shackles of practice: History of psychology, research assessment, and the curriculum. In S. H. Klempe & R. Smith (Eds.), Centrality of history for theory construction in psychology (pp. 91–109). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. (Annals of Theoretical Psychology 14).
Danziger, K. (1994). Does the history of psychology have a future? Theory & Psychology, 4(4), 467–484.
Feigl, H. (1959). Philosophical embarrassments of psychology. American Psychologist, 14(3), 115–128.
Ferro, M. (1984). The use and abuse of history or how the past is taught. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Fischer, D. H. (1970). Historians’ fallacies. New York: Harper.
Fowers, B. (2015). The promise of a flourishing theoretical psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 35(3), 145–159.
Fritze, R. (2011). Invented knowledge. London: Reaktion Books.
Gergen, K. J. (2014). Foreword. In C. Tileaga & J. Byford (Eds.), Psychology and history: Interdisciplinary explorations (pp. xxii–xxiv). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Surrogates for theories. Theory & Psychology, 8(2), 195–204.
Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Mindless statistics. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 33, 587–606.
Gigerenzer, G. (2010). Personal reflections on theory and psychology. Theory & Psychology, 20(6), 733–743.
Guldi, J., & Armitage, D. (2014). The history manifesto. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hanson, N. (1958). Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hanson, N. (1962). The irrelevance of history of science to philosophy of science. Journal of Philosophy, 59, 574–586.
Hatfield, G. (1996). Review Essay: The importance of the history of science for philosophy in general. Synthese, 106, 113–138.
Held, B. (2011). Critique and metacritique in psychology: Whence and wither. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 31(3), 184–192.
Howard, M. (1991). The lessons of history. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hunt, L. (2018). History: Why it matters. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
James, W. (1981). The principles of psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1890).
Koch, S. (1951). Theoretical psychology, 1950: An overview. Psychological Review, 58(4), 295–301.
Koch, S. (1999). Vagrant confessions of an asystematic psychologist: An intellectual biography. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology in human context: Essays in dissidence and reconstruction (pp. 21–48). Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Kukla, A. (1989). Nonempirical issues in psychology. American Psychologist, 44(5), 785–794.
Kukla, A. (2001). Methods of theoretical psychology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. (1977). The relations between the history and the philosophy of science. In T. Kuhn (Ed.), The essential tension (pp. 3–20). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Lamiell, J. (2013). Translator’s preface. History of Psychology, 16(3), 195–196.
Lamiell, J. (2015). Statistical thinking in psychological research. In J. Martin, J. Sugarman, & K. Slaney (Eds.), The Wiley handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology (pp. 200–215). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Lefkowitz, M. (2009). Historiography and myth. In A. Tucker (Ed.), A companion to the philosophy of history and historiography (pp. 353–361). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Longuet-Higgins, H. C. (1982). A new theoretical psychology? Higher Education Quarterly, 36(3), 225–229.
Machamer, P., & Sytsma, J. (2007). Psychology and neuroscience: What’s to worry about? Theory & Psychology, 17(2), 199–216.
MacKay, D. (1988). Under what conditions can theoretical psychology survive and prosper? Integrating the rational and empirical epistemologies. Psychological Review, 95(4), 559–565.
Macmillan, M. (2010). Dangerous games: The uses and abuses of history. New York: Modern Library.
Madsen, K. (1985). Psychological metatheory: An introduction to Volume 3. In K. Madsen & L. P. Mos (Eds.), Annals of theoretical psychology (Vol. 3, pp. 1–19). New York: Plenum.
Martin, J. (2004). What can theoretical psychology do? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 24(1), 1–13.
Martin, J., Sugarman, J., & Slaney, K. (2015a). Editor’s introduction. In J. Martin, J. Sugarman, & K. Slaney (Eds.), The Wiley handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology (pp. 1–20). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Martin, J., Sugarman, J., & Slaney, K. (Eds.). (2015b). The Wiley handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Michell, J. (1999). Measurement in psychology: A critical history of a methodological concept. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Nietzsche, F. (1997). On the uses and disadvantages of history for life. In D. Breazeale (Ed.), Untimely meditations (pp. 57–123). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1874).
Nussbaum, M. (2016). Not for profit: Why democracy needs the humanities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Osbeck, L. (2005). Method and theoretical psychology. Theory & Psychology, 15(1), 5–26.
Petitt, M., & Davidson, I. (2014). Can the history of psychology have an impact? Theory & Psychology, 24(5), 709–716.
Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. Toward a post-critical philosophy. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Robinson, D. (2007). Theoretical psychology: What is it and who needs it? Theory & Psychology, 17(2), 187–198.
Royce, J. (1978). How can we best advance the construction of theory in psychology. Canadian Psychological Review, 19(4), 259–276.
Schwartz, S., Lilienfeld, S., Meca, A., & Sauvigné, K. (2016). The role of neuroscience in psychology: A call for inclusiveness over exclusiveness. American Psychologist, 71(1), 52–70.
Slife, B., & Williams, R. (1997). Toward a theoretical psychology. American Psychologist, 53(2), 117–129.
Small, H. (2013). The value of the humanities. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Smith, R. (2016). History of psychology: What for? In S. H. Klempe & R. Smith (Eds.), Centrality of history for theory construction in psychology (pp. 3–28). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. (Annals of Theoretical Psychology 14).
Srigley, R. (2018, February 22). Whose university is it anyway? Los Angeles Review of Books. Retrieved from https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/whose-university-is-it-anyway/#!.
Stam, H. (2000). Ten years after, decade to come. The contributions of theoretical psychology. Theory & Psychology, 10(1), 5–21.
Stam, H. (2010). Theoretical communities and Theory & Psychology: A decade review. Theory & Psychology, 20(6), 723–731.
Stam, H. (Ed.). (2012a). Theoretical psychology (8 vols.). London: Sage.
Stam, H. (2012b). Theoretical psychology and the multiple ways of being theoretical: An introduction to contemporary readings. In H. Stam (Ed.), Theoretical psychology (Vol. 1, pp. xix–xxxiii). London: Sage.
Teo, T. (2009). Editorial. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 29(1), 1–4.
Teo, T. (2015a). Theoretical psychology: A critical-philosophical outline of core issues. In I. Parker (Ed.), Handbook of critical psychology (pp. 117–126). New York: Routledge.
Teo, T. (2015b). Historical thinking as a tool for theoretical psychology. In J. Martin, J. Sugarman, & K. Slaney (Eds.), The Wiley handbook of theoretical and philosophical psychology (pp. 135–150). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Tissaw, M., & Osbeck, L. (2007). On critical engagement with the mainstream. Theory & Psychology, 17(2), 155–168.
Toomela, A. (2016). Six meanings of the history of science: The case of psychology. In S. H. Klempe & R. Smith (Eds.), Centrality of history for theory construction in psychology (pp. 47–73). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. (Annals of Theoretical Psychology 14).
Tosh, J. (2008). Why history matters. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Toulmin, S. (1961). Foresight and understanding: An enquiry into the aims of science. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Toulmin, S., & Leary, D. (1985). The cult of empiricism in psychology, and beyond. In S. Koch & D. Leary (Eds.), A century of psychology as science (pp. 594–617). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Tweney, R., & Budzynski, C. (2000). The scientific status of American psychology in 1900. American Psychologist, 55(9), 1014–1017.
Valsiner, J. (2015). Historical leads for theory construction in psychology. In C. Gruber, M. Clark, S. Klempe, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), Constraints of agency (pp. 45–48). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. (Annals of Theoretical Psychology 12).
Williams, R. (1999). A history of division 24 (Theoretical and philosophical psychology). In D. Dewsbury (Ed.), Unification through division: Histories of the divisions of the American Psychological Association (Vol. 4, pp. 65–89). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Wundt, W. (1903). Naturwissenschaft und Psychologie [Natural science and psychology]. Leipzig: Engelmann.
Wundt, W. (1911). Die Definition der Psychologie [The definition of psychology]. In W. Wundt (Ed.), Kleine Schriften (Vol. 2, pp. 113–166). Leipzig: Engelmann.
Wundt, W. (1913). Die Psychologie im Kampf ums Dasein [Psychology’s struggle for existence]. Leipzig: Kröner.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Araujo, S.d.F. (2019). A Role for the History of Psychology in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. In: Teo, T. (eds) Re-envisioning Theoretical Psychology. Palgrave Studies in the Theory and History of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16762-2_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16762-2_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-16761-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-16762-2
eBook Packages: Behavioral Science and PsychologyBehavioral Science and Psychology (R0)