Attributions of Responsibility

Abstract

Notwithstanding Hart’s (1968) notion of “causality responsibility,” there is, as we have seen, a fundamental difference between “caused” and “was responsible for.” Many causes can exist independent of intervention by human beings—tornadoes cause extensive damage, bacteria cause disease in animals, lengthening spring days cause new leaves to appear on trees—so the actions of persons constitute only a fraction of the antecedents of effects. Although Reid (1863a, 1863b) was probably correct to argue that our intuitive idea of what is involved in causality arises from the exercise of our own will in doing something, it is still possible to conceive of a cause-effect sequence that does not include even the most remote participation of people. By contrast to this view of human agency as only one of several potential causes, there cannot be responsibility without human participation, either as cause or as perceiver, or both. An assignment of responsibility is a moral judgment, one made about the actions of another (presumably) moral individual. Certainly there are instances of human action for which perceivers will routinely decline to assign moral accountability. But these instances are recognized and debated for the exceptions they are, and even they do not violate the principle that limits “was responsible for” to events involving persons.