Summary
A critique of representational theory in contemporary cognitive psychology from a phenomenological viewpoint. It is concluded that representational, cognitive, theory as a naturalistic, causal, theory of meaning and reference fails as a psychology of the mental.
My thanks to Andy Giorgi and Larry Davidson who led me to make changes in this paper and, more importantly, who taught me about phenomenology.
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© 1988 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
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Mos, L.P. (1988). Cognitive Representation: A Psychology in Search of Mentality. In: Baker, W.J., Mos, L.P., Rappard, H.V., Stam, H.J. (eds) Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology. Recent Research in Psychology. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-3902-4_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-3902-4_15
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