Abstract
The focus of this chapter is on how the constant stream of information that a person experiences every day is summarized into units that are used to communicate or provide the basis for quantification. Two methods are described: those based on the person using cognitive processes to form categories of information and those that involve the investigator using statistical procedures to create domains. In addition, I describe how the content (modular or nonmodular) of these summary statements can vary and what it implies about the summary measure formed. Finally, I illustrate how differences in the content of a domain and the quality-of-life assessment used (generic or disease specific) contribute to the predictive ability of a quantitative assessment.
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Notes
- 1.
Much of the research on category formation that I cite involves studies of objects and perceptual arrays. I recognize that while these studies may be quite relevant when the object of study is the qualitative assessment of a statue or painting, there is a risk when applying these studies to the more complex environment of quality-of-life assessment. However, I find this extension to be acceptable in most instances, especially if it stimulates the required research.
- 2.
Ashby and Maddox (2005), like Estes, distinguish the terms categories and concepts, although they acknowledge that it is common for them to be used interchangeably. Thus, a category is defined as a collection of similar objects belonging to the same group, while a concept refers to a collection of more abstract entities, such as ideas. Again, the interchange of the terms category and concept is another demonstration of the fact that a person has the cognitive capability to make a concrete entity abstract and vice versa.
- 3.
As expressed here, the difference between a category and a domain constraint is that the constraints are not made explicit when a category is formed, but they usually are (by an investigator) when a domain is formed.
- 4.
These two memory systems do not refer to short- and long-term memory, both systems are long-term memory system, with short-term memory being an activated portion of the information held in long-term memory.
- 5.
A number of authors have proposed different schemes for characterizing modular domains. Geary and Huffman (2002) propose that modules can be conceived of in terms of neural, perceptual, cognitive, and functional modules.
- 6.
In Chap. 2, I described the process of how a conceptual metaphor is formed. I suggested that a structural mapping was occurring between the base and the target (Bowdle and Gentner 2005). In the context of the current discussion, I suggest that this mapping is, at first, a controlled process that can become automatic with continued exposure, as would be expected with a conceptual metaphor.
- 7.
Hirschfeld and Gelman (1994) and others use the term “domain-specific” to refer to entities that are quite prescribed in terms of their neurological and psychological structure and function (e.g., vision). This term may be confusing, especially since I am using the term domain to refer to a wide range of types of domains. I have opted to use the term “modular” instead of “domain-specific”. However, the term modular also has a broad reference, but I don’t believe this should be as confusing as concurrently using the phrase domain-specific and domain. I will clarify the different usages of the terms when I discuss Fodor’s (1993) nine criteria for a module.
- 8.
Fodor has written a more recent book on this topic published in 2000, but I will focus on the 1983 book and leave the issue of Fodor’s current thoughts for another time and place.
- 9.
The phenomenon of “upregulation” is an excellent example of acquired modularity. This is so because a specific biologically-based event occurs which produces a change in a person’s pain sensitivity that did not exist prior to the event (i.e., it is acquired), and which represents a change in a particular modality (pain perception) that has a physiological basis.
- 10.
Describing health status as “not being a domain of interest” does not mean that I am suggesting it not be measured. Just that it will be measured by the domains that make it up, which if I follow Patrick and Erickson’s (1993) recommendations would include symptoms, functional states, and health perceptions.
- 11.
By “unique” measures, I mean measures that do not have to refer to other domains for their definition.
- 12.
Whether and how the content of a domain can be organized into a dimension is a critical issue. This may occur statistically, as during an IRT analysis and the creation of a data bank, but may also involve the interaction between an investigator’s own cognitive processing and various statistical procedures (e.g., as when an investigator labels a factor following a factor analysis and orders the elements in the domain along a dimension). However, it is also possible that the entities within a domain spontaneously form a dimension. Thus, you can have a quality-of-life domain and have the dimension of goodness or badness of the qualitative entities within the domain. In fact, it can be argued that you can’t have a cognitive dimension without first grouping this information into a category, or a dimension with the domain.
- 13.
The authors of the DSM system make clear that they are aware that the domains of their system contain arbitrary elements (American Psychiatric Association, 1994 to 2000; p. xxii).
- 14.
Some would argue that the Patient Reported Outcomes (PROs) movement is an example of domain formation gone wild, with practically any number of combinations of indicators included in a domain. Actually, PROs are an excellent example of domains that could benefit from the type of analysis being discussed in this chapter.
- 15.
Abbreviations
- ADVS:
-
Activities of Daily Vision Scale (Manguione et al. 1992)
- CAT:
-
Computer adaptive testing
- CL:
-
Confidence limits
- DSM:
-
Diagnostic and statistical manual (American Psychiatric Association 2000)
- EQ-5D:
-
EuroQol group 5 dimensions (Brooks et al. 2003)
- Generic:
-
Generic quality-of-life assessment
- HADS:
-
Hospital Anxiety and Depressions Scale (Zigmond and Snaith 1983)
- HRQWOL:
-
Health-related quality-of-life
- IRT:
-
Item response theory
- LogMAR:
-
Log of minimal angle of resolution
- PROs:
-
Patient-reported outcomes
- RSCL:
-
Rotterdam symptom checklist (De Haes et al. 1990)
- SF-36:
-
Medical outcome study short form 36 (Ware and Sherbourne 1992)
- SF-36 PFS:
-
Physical functioning items of the SF-36
- SG:
-
Standard gamble utility measure
- SG-VH:
-
Standard gamble-visual health
- SIP:
-
Sickness Impact Scale (Bergner et al. 1981)
- SVA:
-
Snellen visual acuity
- SWB:
-
Subjective well-being
- TyPE:
-
The TyPE specification assesses visual functioning in five dimensions: (1) distance vision; (2) near vision; (3) daytime driving; (4) nighttime driving; and (5) glare
- VA:
-
Visual acuity
- VF-14:
-
Visual functioning 14 items (Steinberg et al. 1994)
- Vision-Specific:
-
Vision-specific HRQOL assessment
- VR:
-
Verbal utility report
- WHO/PBD VF20:
-
World Health Organization Standards for Vision 2003
- WMC:
-
Working memory capacity
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Barofsky, I. (2012). Summary Measurement: The Role of Categories or Domains. In: Quality. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9819-4_6
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