Abstract
This chapter addresses the issue of whether the term well-being, particularly the phrase subjective well-being, can be used as an indicator of quality, and quality-of-life. It examines both the way language is used and the cognitive basis of these expressions. Based on the assumption that subjective well-being (SWB), in particular, is a form of emotional expression, the chapter examines whether the phrase is a discrete emotion, a product of cognitive-emotional processes, or cognitive-emotional regulation. It ends with a discussion of how subjective well-being can be modeled. Neurobiological, nonlinear, and simulated embodiment models are considered. The chapter concludes that SWB and quality and quality-of-life, while overlapping concepts, are best keep distinct, since to use them interchangeably dilutes the unique meaning of each. For this reason it is not recommended to consider SWB, in and of its self, as an indicator of quality-of-life or health-related quality-of-life (HRQOL).
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Notes
- 1.
The statement I made here is consistent with the James-Lange theory, which posits that my phenomenology is determined by prior bodily processes, such as an emotional response. I recommend an article by Koriat et al. (2006) who provides an interesting discussion about this issue but now discussed in the context of metacognition. Their point is that, at least at the metacognitive level, behavior (or bodily responses) may determine subjective experience, but that subjective experience may also determine behavior.
- 2.
Dictionaries differ, somewhat, in how they define well-being. Many of these definitions refer to a person being prosperous, as well as other mentioned features. Well-being and welfare are associated, with welfare presumably functioning as a general category that includes well-being. The term welfare, of course, can refer to individual or societal issues, and I will be interpreting this term, at least as a first approximation, as referring to an individual’s well-being.
- 3.
Some of you might argue that all the indicators included in the phrase SWB have a common origin in emotion or mood terms, and that this can function as a common organizing principle. However, as I will discuss, the measures commonly considered to be SWB indicators do not easily fit this type of classification approach. For example, a satisfaction indicator is generated by a distinctly different cognitive process than a descriptive affect statement. A satisfaction assessment involves two or more cognitive processes: it is a comparison. While, a happiness assessment can be a direct affective response: “Are you happy? Yes.”
- 4.
Some may argue that money is an object that like an emotion may determine our feelings of well-being. However, our financial status may be only one of the factors correlated with our sense of well-being, so that it would not be appropriate to consider well-being a primary emotion.
- 5.
I will use the phrase “emotion words” since this is common in the literature, but also realize it tends to defeat the purpose of using such words more precisely. As used here, “emotion words” will also refer to terms used to express well-being, moods, feelings, and the wide variety of terms used to express particular emotions.
- 6.
There are various types of speech acts (Bach 2006); constatives (e.g., affirming, alleging, and so on), directives (advising, excusing, warning, and so on), commissives (agreeing, inviting, volunteering and so on), and acknowledgments (apologizing, greeting, accepting, and so on).
- 7.
The reader may point out that reversing the sentence, “Vietnam is another Iraq” would also not retain the metonym properties of the original sentence. However, both terms in the sentence are highly salient with many concrete examples of the terms which can contribute to the meaning they engender. This is much less so for the terms “well-being and quality-of-life”, since both are considerably more abstract, and dependent on their context-dependent definitions and cognitive role to distinguish between them.
- 8.
Diener et al. (1998) state, “Subjective well-being is a person’s evaluation of his or her life. The evaluation can be in terms of cognitive states such as satisfaction with one’s marriage, work and life, and it can be in terms of ongoing affect (i.e., the presence of positive emotions and mood, and the absence of unpleasant affect). I believe that subjective well-being results from people having a feeling of mastery and making progress towards their goals, from one’s temperament, immersion in interesting and pleasurable activities, and positive social relationships” (p. 34). This quotation is representative of the type of statement which contributes to the confusion between the terms quality-of-life and well-being, since it claims an evaluation has occurred without assessing it independent of a description of the person’s state. For example, making progress towards one’s personal goals is not evidence, in and of itself, of a particular quality-of-life. Of course, it could be declared a favored outcome but that would reflect the investigator’s perspective; not necessarily what a person would prefer. As previously mentioned, what this statement lacks is evidence of a valuation of the evaluation; an independent cognitive assessment or preference statement by the respondent for being in a particular valued state; and an act characteristic of a hybrid construct. I will discuss this in more detail as I proceed.
- 9.
These items represent modifications of the positive affect items from the Bradburn Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn 1969).
- 10.
What would be depicted neurocognitively, for example, is the spatial display characteristic of a container, or the movement across space of the motion metaphor implicit in the term e-motion. The content associated with these representations would be of secondary interest. What I am describing here, of course, is the same idea I spoke about in Chap. 7 when I suggested that what was common to all qualitative assessments was not their content but rather a common cognitive mechanism which leads to the formation of a hybrid construct.
- 11.
Kövecses (1991) in his article uses the word “value” to refer to the quantity of happiness, but I will use the term “quantity” to prevent any confusion that may arise in what is already a fairly complex corpus associated with the word “value.”
- 12.
The term valence is a good example of a duel usage term, with its literal meaning referring to the number of electrons which are shared by atoms that combine to form a molecule, as opposed to its figurative form which alludes to the force characteristic of an entity.
- 13.
By claiming that SWB has substance does not conflict with SWB being an abstract concept, since brain imaging studies have demonstrated that abstract concepts can generate distinctive cortical patterns.
- 14.
An exception is Bramston’s (2002) paper which considers many of the same issues discussed here, although his assessment of the literature is somewhat dated compared to the current review.
- 15.
The distinction between subjective and psychological well-being has also been characterized in terms of the difference between hedonic and eudaemonic conceptualizations of SWB (Ryan and Deci 2001).
- 16.
The classic example of Phinneas Gage (Chap. 11, p. 264), and his change in personality following a frontal lobe lesion, is an example of the consequence of disrupting the functional inhibition system mediating emotional processes.
- 17.
Averill (1990) suggests, as an alternative, that the German word, Gemütsbewegung, is used by ordinary people to refer to the term emotion. If Gemütsbewegung is disaggregated, then Gemüts can be defined as referring to feelings, while bewegung would be defined as referring to emotion or agitation. Together these terms maybe read as “feelings of emotion or agitation”.
- 18.
When a professional German-English translator was consulted (Personal Communication: E. Russon, December 7, 2006), the word wohlbefinden was suggested as an optimal translation for the term well-being, with the noun, Befinden used to refer to health. Translated in this way the term well-being would mean “good health”.
- 19.
The term feeling has a number of definitions (The Complete Oxford English Dictionary 1970), including being a physical sensation, a sensation perceived by touch, an emotion, the capacity or readiness to feel, what one feels in regard to something, the general tone or a building or work of art, and so on. An analysis of the synonyms (Roget’s et al. 1992) associated with the terms emotion and feeling, reveals that three terms are considered synonyms of emotion (e.g., feeling, excitement, and attitude), while 12 terms are associated with the term feeling. Of these, the terms, feeling/emotion, and attitude were found to be common to both terms and can be considered to provide “core meaning” (Table 11.2). Also of interest, is the observation that the more abstract term, emotion, had significantly fewer synonyms than the more concrete term, feeling. This is consistent with the existence of an informational hierarchy, and suggests the hypothesis that a large semantic domain is associated with a term’s presence at a basic level of information which may also be associated with its presence in different languages.
- 20.
The assumption that SWB is an emotion is quite evident in the positive psychology literature which directly associates SWB with happiness, but rarely if ever defines how the terms are similar or different. At best, SWB functions as a label that refers to a variety of positive emotional terms, such as joy, happiness, and so on. A recent newspaper article by Max (2007) entitled “Happiness 101” makes the association between SWB and happiness quite clear, but now in the popular press, although the author refers to the existence of the association in the academic literature.
- 21.
The observation that emotion words have different syntactic roles in different cultures raises questions about whether the translation between languages can capture the same meaning as communicated by the reference language. The same question can be asked of whether the meaning associated with well-being can be accurately translated between languages.
- 22.
Aesthesis is defined as the sensation of touch.
- 23.
One way a natural kind may occur is if it occurs automatically, unconsciously, much as occurs when a category is formed.
- 24.
It is interesting to briefly review the history of the notion of a natural-kind, since it evolved from a practical problem (Hacking 2002). In the mid-nineteen century, European biologists and explorers were returning from expeditions with various types of plants and animals. The diversity of these items was so great that it became obvious that this material had to be organized into various classes (a problem in taxonomy) to make some sense of them. The question, then became could these items fit into either natural categories or artificially (arbitrarily) created domains? Thus, all of Darwin’s finches fit into a unique category, in that all had a particular type of beak, but their coloration, size, and so on were different requiring a more arbitrary classification.
- 25.
- 26.
In semantics and literary theory, connotation and denotation reflect the figurative or literal meaning of words. Thus, if you saw an image of a rose, its denotation would be the physical state of a flower on a stem, but its connotation would be as a symbol of passion and love.
- 27.
What I am claiming is that in order to perform an evaluation a referent has to be unconsciously (e.g., by activating a specific cortical site) or consciously acknowledged.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
Tesser and Martin (1996) provide a bit of history here that is useful. They point out that originally an attitude was thought to reflect what people liked or disliked about objects, persons, or events, but that in the 1950s a number of theories were introduced that suggested that attitudes could also be effected by various cognitive processes. For example, Heider’s (1958) balance theory, Festinger’s (1957) dissonance theory, and Rosenberg’s (1956) consistency theory all suggested a role for cognition and behavior in attitudes.
- 31.
Out of necessity, I will not be able to review the history of the development of the concept of emotion. Instead, I recommend Joseph Le Doux’s book, “The Emotional Brain…” (1996; Chap. 30) for a very readable description of this history.
- 32.
Gibson believes that it is inappropriate to study vision as an isolated system, independent of its environment. He claims that I perceive at the level of flat, rigid or extended surfaces, and substances rather than at the level of particles or atoms. He states: “… the affordance of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson 1979; p. 127). Thus, an affordance exists relative to the capabilities of a person, yet is independent of the person’s ability to perceive it, and does not change as the person’s needs and wants change. It also should be noted that Gibson’s notion of affordance is invariant, reflecting the constancy in our perception in the face of an ever changing world. While Lazarus does not state this directly, the implication here is that the appraisal process may also have invariant characteristics.
- 33.
If you asked me to define what I mean by the term description, in the three components of a hybrid construct (that is, description, evaluation and qualification) I would also refer to Neisser’s (1967; p. 4) description of a cognition.
- 34.
The model that Sanders et al. (2005) present has a distinct similarity to both the Kim-Prieto et al. (2005) and Wilson and Cleary (1995) models, in that it attempts to trace the relationship of a number of indicators. It differs from the Smolensky and Legendre (2006) model in that it can’t, at this point, offer a mathematical description of the relationship between the components of the model.
Abbreviations
- ABS:
-
Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn 1969)
- Cantril Ladder:
-
Cantril (1965)
- CER:
-
Cognitive-emotional regulation
- CPM:
-
Component process model
- DT:
-
Dizygotic twins
- GWB:
-
General Well-being Scale (Dupuy 1984)
- HRQOL:
-
Health-related Quality-of-life
- IT:
-
Inferior temporal cortex
- MPQ:
-
Multidimensional personality questionnaire (Tellegen 1982)
- MT:
-
Monozygotic twins
- NA:
-
Negative affect
- NHANES:
-
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (1973)
- NNM:
-
Neural network model
- PA:
-
Positive affect
- PANAS:
-
Positive and negative affect schedules (Watson et al. 1988)
- QWB:
-
Quality of Well-being Scale (Kaplan and Anderson 1990)
- SEC:
-
Stimulus evaluation checks
- SWB:
-
Subjective well-being
- SWLS:
-
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Pavot and Diener 1993)
- WB:
-
Well-being Scale
- WHO:
-
World Health Organization
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Barofsky, I. (2012). Well-Being as an Indicator of Quality or Quality-of-Life. In: Quality. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9819-4_11
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