Abstract
Most of us have a somewhat inconsistent attitude toward our being selves and persons. On the one hand, we frequently act as if there is nothing that is more real or true about our lives than the seemingly obvious fact that we exist as thinking, feeling individuals. Indeed, so powerful does this idea seem that René Descartes (1960) established an entire philosophical tradition based on it. On the other hand, most of us experience at least occasional difficulties in determining exactly who we are, what we want, and what makes for a meaningful life, and not infrequently describe such difficulties as stemming from problems of knowing our true selves or the kind of person we really are. To complicate matters, what we mean by “self” or “person” is not at all straightforward, and most of us would experience considerable difficulty in giving a clear and consistent definition of these terms. Nonetheless, we mostly believe that it is important to understand and feel good about who and what we are as selves and persons as a prerequisite to doing and living well. And, despite difficulties of definition and accessibility to what we might regard as our true selves or the kind of person we are, the possibility that we might not have selves at all or exist as persons would seem more than passing strange to most of us.
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For example, Peter Strawson (1959) has argued that reactive attitudes, such as gratitude, that assume the possibility of morally praiseworthy freedom of action are so deeply embedded in our form of life that it would be impossible for us to abandon them even if determinism were true. Such dissolutionist stratagems certainly qualify as compatibilist (in opposition to the incompatibilist positions of libertarianism and hard determinism). However, some more contemporary compatibilists (e.g., the philosopher, Frankfurt, 1971, and the psychologist, Rychlak, 1988) have not so much treated incompatibilism as a pseudo-problem that should be dissolved, but have attempted to provide alternative conceptions of freedom that do not deny, although they do “soften,” determinism. Thus, Frankfurt talks about the uniquely human capacity to form “higher-order desires,” and Rychlak speaks about a kind of “transpredication” rooted in the use of language that allows humans to respond antithetically to their determination.
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Martin, J., Sugarman, J.H., Hickinbottom, S. (2010). Introduction: The Problem of Selves and Persons in Psychology. In: Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3_1
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