Abstract
This study had no other ambition than to sketch out emerging forms of civil-military relations in the so-called posttransitional period of praetorian succession. If four models could be identified, it is obviously from an ideal-type perspective, for, in effect, these categories do not operate under such pure forms and rather constitute fluid situations. The Ivory Coast is a case in point: Guei’s intervention makes it belong to the recourse model
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References
To borrow Larry Diamond’s, Antony H. M. Kirk-Greene’s, and Oyeleye Oyediran’s title (1997). Among recent books written on this question (the litterature is voluminous), see: Daloz and Quantin (1997), Joseph (1999), Bratton and Van de Walle (2000), and Géopolitique africaine (2001). For a review of pre-1995 works, see Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot (1995).
Nothing important has been written on Cameroon and Gabon’s civil-military affairs; about recent changes, see Sindjoun (1999) and Rosatanga-Rigault (2000).
Sam Decalo (1998) has lengthly discussed at length the case of these countries spared by military domination.
A good counterexample is offered by the Ivorian military which, after enjoying the full attention of the regime (and, for that matter, it functioned on the Western managerial model of subordination) found itself, under Henri Konan Bédié’s leadership, gradually marginalized, a situation which, with other factors, relates to General Robert Gueï’s taking over in December 1999 (Kieffer, 2000).
The supervision of the 2000 presidential elections was confided to a general, Lamine Cissé, by outgoing president Abdou Diouf, who told him to do everything to keep the elections free; when it was clear that Diouf was losing, Cissé advised him to be prepared to recognize Abdoulaye Wade’s victory (Cissé, 2001).
Though at the same time, it could induce feelings of relative deprivation about one’s material standards and professional status, as well as arouse a less favorable opinion on the regime. Moreover the, use in multilateral operations could raise problems with the military as in Morocco during the Gulf War (Leveau, 1993; Daguzan, 1998).
To use the classic distinction proposed by Samuel P. Huntington (1957), who is rather partisan of the former over the latter, which, though potentially risky, can nevertheless have beneficial effects, notably in a phase of democratic consolidation (Karsten, 1997); a view which converges with Morris Janowitz’s (1960).
These are the most salient elements retained here; Kemalism is indeed a more complex configuration which has moreover evolved with time; the analogy was suggested by Janowitz (1964).
Though such groups tend to arouse the jealousy of the regular military, their intervention, notably in the area of domestic public order, saved the military from situations sometimes technically difficult to manage and from the alienation of the public opinion, as became the case in North Africa (Leveau, 1996; Daguzan, 1998; Souaidia, 2000).
Such as for instance the reintegration of those excluded under the previous praetorian regime, the readjusment of promotions, the modulation of sanctions against former authorities, and so on. Mali, exemplary in this regard, has gone as far as to organize the amalgamation in the military of members of rebellious militians of the North (Thiriot, 1999).
There is an important literature about this phenomenon (Zartman, 1995; Migdal, 1988; and regarding Africa, Forrest, 1998). For a few authors, such a phenomenon does necessarily call for a negative interpretation as it could hide a reconstruction in the forms power is exercised and economy handled; see for instance: Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (2000) or Achille Mbembe (2000).
For a summary of such evolutions and their impact, see Béatrice Hibou (1999) and Harvey Feigenbaum et al. (1999).
On the communist model see Bradley R. Gitz (1992).
Prescriptions for harmonious civil-military relations in democratic situation have been numerous (recently: Huntington, 1996; Kohn, 1997), but rather theoretical, showing thus the limits of political engineering in this area (also: Luckham, 1996).
An evolution which necessarily will take some time. Admittedly the participation to external missions helps these efforts, but until now they also create problems given their nature and the still limited efforts undertaken by African countries in this area (Olonisakin, 1997). This said, initiatives such as the RECAMP or ACRI programs, organized by France and the United States, should contribute to these evolutions. It remains, as noted above, that multilateral participation is always susceptible to induce feeling of relative deprivations due to “envious comparison,” a fortiori create unrest, as was the case in the Ivory Coast in 1999 and Senegal in 2001 if the soldiers’ bonuses are not paid on time or are simply retained; it implies therefore a sound treasury.
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Martin, M.L. (2006). Soldiers and Governments in Postpraetorian Africa. In: Caforio, G. (eds) Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34576-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34576-0_11
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