Introduction
Perceptual adaptation refers to the continuous recalibration of the response properties of perceptual and sensory systems driven by recent sensory experiences (Clifford and Rhodes
2005). For example, a quiet and continuous pure tone will be perceived to decrease in loudness over time (adaptation to loudness; see Lawson et al.
2015), while prolonged exposure to a face identity will cause a bias to perceive subsequently presented faces as dissimilar to it (adaptation to face identity; see Pellicano et al.
2007). Such adaptation is a ubiquitous property of perception and is thought to offer many functional advantages (e.g., Kohn
2007), in particular with regards to the efficiency with which sensory systems distinguish relevant from irrelevant stimuli. Limitations in adaptation should imply increases in the transmission of redundant information and should render individuals less able to distinguish relevant from irrelevant stimuli (Barlow
1990; Clifford et al.
2007; Webster et al.
2005). Such limitations could therefore have profound effects on how individuals perceive and interpret incoming sensory information.
Adaptation is also pertinent to theoretical accounts of autistic perception aiming to account for a range of sensory atypicalities and symptoms in the condition (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association
2013). Atypicalities in perceptual adaptation have been thought to reflect difficulties of autistic
1 individuals in deriving or using prior knowledge representations accrued from recent sensory experiences (Pellicano and Burr
2012). Within the Bayesian inference, or predictive-coding theoretical frameworks, which, in broad terms, suggest that the brain continually exploits the statistics of the world to predict current sensory input using a hierarchical and bidirectional processing system which aims to minimise prediction error within a cascade of cortical processing (Clark
2013; Friston
2010), adaptation may relate to the atypical encoding of precision in the perceptual hierarchy in autism (Lawson et al.
2014) or the inability to process flexibly prediction errors (Van de Cruys et al.
2014).
Given the ubiquitous presence of adaptation in perception, an intriguing possibility is that autistic individuals’ atypicalities in adaptation are pervasive across perceptual domains. The presence of domain-general atypicalities in adaptation could account for sensory issues in autistic people (e.g., why they might find certain sounds particularly disturbing), as well as core social difficulties, on the basis of a common neural mechanism (Lawson et al.
2018).
With regard to social stimuli, attenuated adaptation in autism has been observed consistently within the face-processing domain, including, for example, for facial identity in autistic children (Ewing et al.
2013b; Pellicano et al.
2007) and relatives of autistic children (Fiorentini et al.
2012), for facial configuration (Ewing et al.
2013a,
b) and eye-gaze direction in children (Pellicano et al.
2013) and adults (Lawson et al.
2018), and for emotional expressions in children (Rhodes et al.
2018) and adults (Rutherford et al.
2012). van Boxtel et al. (
2016) also found that autistic children show reduced adaptation to action discrimination in biological motion (walking vs. running).
Turning to the processing of non-social stimuli, autistic children have been found to present attenuated adaptation to numerosity (Turi et al.
2015) and, in the auditory domain, autistic adults have been found to present attenuated adaptation to loudness (Lawson et al.
2015) and audiovisual integration (Turi et al.
2016). Three studies, however, have failed to find evidence of atypical adaptive-coding abilities, including Cook et al. (
2014), who reported intact adaptation to facial expression and identity in autistic adults, Karaminis et al. (
2015), who found that autistic and typical children did not differ in the degree of adaptation of perceptual causality, and Maule et al. (
2018), who found that autistic and typical adults did not differ in the degree of adaptation to colour.
In this study, we contribute new evidence about the adaptive coding of the speed of biological motion in autistic children and adolescents. The examination of the adaptive coding of biological motion in autism is important for two reasons. First, the processing of biological motion is key for a wide range of social competencies, such as inferring other people’s emotions, mood, and intentions (e.g., Brooks et al.
2008). Previous research on the abilities of autistic individuals to process biological motion stimuli has produced mixed results. Autistic individuals have been found to present reduced sensitivity to biological motion and atypical brain activation patterns following the presentation of relevant biological stimuli in some studies (Annaz et al.
2012; Blake et al.
2003; Freitag et al.
2008; Klin and Jones
2008; Koldewyn et al.
2010; Nackaerts et al.
2012; Wang et al.
2015; see also Wang et al.
2018, for a recent behavioural genetics approach), but other studies have found no such difficulties (Cusack et al.
2015; Edey et al.
2019; Jones et al.
2011; Murphy et al.
2009; Saygin et al.
2010; van Boxtel et al.
2016). With regard to the adaptive coding of biological motion in autism, van Boxtel et al. (
2016) found attenuated adaptation to action discrimination in autistic children while action discrimination (per se) was intact. There are (to our knowledge) no other studies examining the adaptive coding of biological motion in autism beyond action discrimination (van Boxtel et al.
2016).
Second, it is important to examine the adaptive coding of biological motion in autism to establish whether findings for attenuated adaptation in autism during the processing of social stimuli are specific to faces or extend to other, high-level social stimuli. This could be likely as biological motion is supported by high-level neuronal mechanisms within the superior temporal gyrus (STS) and the fusiform and the lingua gyri (Gobbini et al.
2007; Vaina et al.
2001), that is, brain areas that are also involved in the processing of faces (Grossman et al.
2000), as well as the extrastriate and fusiform body areas (EBA and FBA; Jastorff and Orban
2009).
In this study, we used a different paradigm for biological motion from that used in the study by van Boxtel et al. (
2016). Our paradigm focuses on adaptive coding of the speed of running silhouettes presented with point light displays (PLDs). We employed child- and autism-friendly methodologies and we also aimed to account for participants’ attention to the stimuli. This was important as earlier studies have shown that attention modulates the size of adaptation (Kreutzer et al.
2015; Rhodes et al.
2011). Controlling for attention was achieved by employing a dual-task paradigm, in which the primary task measured the perception of biological motion and adaptive coding, while the secondary task motivated participants to attend to the middle of the screen and assessed their attention (see also Ewing et al.
2013b; Karaminis et al.
2015; Lawson et al.
2018; Rhodes et al.
2018). We also collected eye-movement data to quantify participants’ looking preferences during the task.
Discussion
In this study, we compared autistic and typical participants, of similar age and ability, on the adaptive coding of the speed of biological motion. We hypothesised that autistic individuals’ atypicalities in the adaptive coding of facial stimuli (Ewing et al.
2013a; Lawson et al.
2018; Pellicano et al.
2013; Rhodes et al.
2018; Rutherford et al.
2012) should generalise to non-facial social stimuli and predicted that autistic participants should show less adaptation to the speed of the PLDs of our task than the typical comparison participants. We found that both groups showed significant adaptation effects—but, contrary to our prediction, that the magnitude of adaptation was comparable in autistic and typical participants. This finding could not be attributed to group differences in attention or to looking differences, as both accuracy on the change-detection task and the scatter-of-fixations measure were similar across groups.
Furthermore, the lack of differences in adaptation between autistic and typical participants could not be due to differences in precision in speed discrimination. We found that the two groups were equally precise. This latter result is consistent with studies that do not find differences in the processing of biological motion in autism (Cusack et al.
2015; Jones et al.
2011; Murphy et al.
2009; Saygin et al.
2010; van Boxtel et al.
2016) rather than those that report reduced sensitivity and differences in the brain activation patterns to biological stimuli (Annaz et al.
2012; Blake et al.
2003; Freitag et al.
2008; Klin and Jones
2008; Koldewyn et al.
2010; Nackaerts et al.
2012).
Our results are also inconsistent with the study on adaptation to biological motion by van Boxtel et al. (
2016), which examined a similar number of autistic and typical children. It is possible that this discrepancy is due to the focus on different aspects of biological motion (“running speed” vs. discrimination of type of movement in van Boxtel et al.
2016). It is difficult to understand the origin of these discrepancies without further investigation of performance in different types of biological motion within the same individual. It would be interesting to replicate our and van Boxtel et al.’s methods, also considering other biological motion characteristics such as gender, which is more explicitly social and to which adaptation has previously been shown in non-autistic adults (Jordan et al.
2006; Troje et al.
2006).
Another factor that could be considered in future studies is the likely correspondence between the kinematics of the test stimuli and the kinematics of participants. One study has reported that autistic adults present atypical kinematics and that the degree of such atypicalities predicts performance in a biological motion perception task (Cook et al.
2013). It is possible that the perceptual similarity or dissimilarity between the kinematics of stimuli and participants could also affect the adaptive coding of biological motion.
One important methodological feature of our study is that it carefully examined differences in attention. This was achieved by including the secondary change-detection task and using eye-tracking. By contrast, in van Boxtel et al. (
2016), where autistic children were found to present attenuated adaptation, “the experimenter monitored fixation throughout the experiment, providing reminders as deemed necessary” (p. 4). Arguably, the use of a change-detection task is a more robust method for directing participants’ attention to the fixation point. Interestingly, the post hoc analysis of the eye-tracking data showed that the more participants attended to the fixation point, the larger the magnitude of adaptation. Therefore, even though autistic participants did not differ on average from typical participants on the degree of adaptation, the scatter of fixation accounted for adaptation performance. This result raises the possibility that differences in adaptation in many studies could result from attention differences. It is thus also very important to control for attention in adaptation studies (see also gaze-contingent paradigms; e.g., Wilms et al.
2010). To our knowledge, controlling for attention has been employed in earlier studies on adaptation in autism by Ewing et al. (
2013b) on face identity, Karaminis et al. (
2015) on perceptual causality, Lawson et al. (
2018) on eye-gaze direction and Rhodes et al. (
2018) on facial expression. Our study on adaptation to the running speed of biological motion in autism is novel in combining the use of a secondary attention task with eye-tracking.
Our study is not without its shortcomings. We applied four exclusion criteria and thus excluded a considerable number of participants from our initial dataset to obtain a dataset that would allow measuring the adaptive coding of biological motion. The dual-task paradigm was also demanding, especially for younger participants. Finally, adaptation to biological motion in participants who were not able to attend to stimuli was also not explored in this study.
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